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The First Amendment Right
to a Remedy
Benjamin Plener Cover*
Scholars and jurists agree that the First Amendment right “to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances” includes a right of court
access, but narrowly define this right as the right to file a lawsuit. This
dominant view fails to meaningfully differentiate between the right to
petition, the freedom of speech, and due process, missing the distinct
significance of the Petition Clause when individuals petition courts. The
most significant threats to court access today occur after the filing stage,
when courts deny or limit remedies to legally injured persons — by
enforcing a mandatory arbitration provision or an exhaustion
requirement, granting an official qualified or absolute immunity from suit,
or drastically reducing a damages award pursuant to a statutory cap. By
defining court access too narrowly, the prevailing theory of the right to
petition renders the First Amendment silent in the face of these threats.
This Article fills this gap in First Amendment theory by presenting the
first systematic account of the right to petition the courts that expands the
concept of court access from procedural forum access to substantive
remedial access — guaranteeing the right of a legally injured person to
obtain a meaningful remedy. This remedial theory best accounts for the
history, text, and precedent of the Petition Clause. As a historical matter,
this theory gains force from the insight that the First Amendment right to
petition is best understood as the merger of the English right to petition
and the English right to a remedy. These antecedent rights controlled
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petitioning practice directed at different institutional actors, but, when
those petitions were legal in nature, there was a shared expectation that
relief, where warranted, would follow. From a textual perspective, the
remedial theory gives the Petition Clause meaning independent of the
Speech Clause, and it explains why the Framers expanded the Petition
Clause’s recipient subclause from “the Legislature” to “the Government.”
Jurisprudentially, the theory garners a perhaps surprising degree of
support from both early and modern Supreme Court precedent. This
theory could translate naturally into a tiered scrutiny doctrinal
framework for remedial access claims, with more deferential review for
neutral time, place, and manner provisions, and heightened scrutiny when
remedial burdens are based on the content of the lawsuit, the identity of
the plaintiff, or the defendant’s governmental status.
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INTRODUCTION
Ubi jus ibi remedium — “where there is a right, there should be a
remedy.”1 This ancient legal maxim articulates a great aspirational
ideal of Anglo-American legal culture.2 But it is not an accurate
description of the American legal system. Not every person who
suffers (or fears) legal injury obtains a remedy from the courts. The
person may lack the resources or sophistication to access the judicial
forum in the first place. But even when a legally injured person files
suit, a court may deny a remedy for a host of reasons. Perhaps the
plaintiff failed to exhaust other remedies, or signed a contract of
adhesion containing a mandatory arbitration provision, or filed after
expiry of a statute of limitation or repose. Perhaps the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated by a state judge or prosecutor who
enjoys absolute immunity under the Court’s interpretation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, or by a police officer whose excessive force crossed
no clearly established line for purposes of qualified immunity
doctrine. For all these reasons — and more — the courthouse door
may be open, but the remedial function of the courts may be closed.
The gap between right and remedy is real, and possibly growing.
In the face of remedy denial, the critical question is whether a
legally injured person enjoys an enforceable right to a remedy. Unlike
an aspirational ideal, an enforceable remedial right would entail a
correlative duty upon courts to provide redress and thereby impose
meaningful constraints on remedy denial. There is significant
disagreement on the source, scope, and very existence of a remedial
right. State constitutional provisions in forty states3 explicitly or
implicitly codify a “right to a remedy,”4 but interpretation of these
1 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485-86
(1987) [hereinafter Of Sovereignty]. The equitable analogue of this legal maxim is
“equity will not suffer wrong without a remedy.” JOHN NORTON POMEROY, 2 A TREATISE
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADAPTED
FOR ALL THE STATES AND TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE
REFORMED PROCEDURE § 423 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).
2 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777,
784-86 (2004) (referring to maxim as a “platitude”).
3 Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1309, 1310 n.6 (2003) (citing state constitutional provisions).
4 Id. at 1310; see also John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions
and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 237 (1991);
Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to Understand the
Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005, 1005 n.1 (2001); William C.
Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of
Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 340-42
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provisions by state supreme courts has varied widely across
jurisdiction.5 In recent years, scholars have argued for a federal
constitutional right to a remedy based on the Due Process Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, or the Privileges and Immunities Clause,6 but
cases analyzing remedy denial under the Fourteenth Amendment have
generally applied rational basis review and upheld the restrictions.
Building on these prior efforts,7 this article argues that the most
compelling basis for a federal remedial right — as a matter of history,
(1997); Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR.
L. REV. 125, 136 (1970); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
1197, 1198-99 (1992).
5 For example, Article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution states: “Every
person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he
may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay,
conformable to the laws.” MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8. But when Justice John E. Simonett
of the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that those words be carved into the granite
wall of the Minnesota Judicial Center, Justice Glenn E. Kelley objected because “if
[they] put that up on the wall, people are going to read it before they came into court
and say, ‘Here, I’m entitled to a remedy. Let’s have it.’” Randall Tietjen, “An
Inarticulate Premise Intuitively Felt,” 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 784, 793-94 (2013).
The original architectural plans proposed to carve on the “Dedicatory Wall” the names
of the state Supreme Court Justices, the Governor, legislative leaders, and the architect
himself. Id. Justice Kelley cautioned that the provision is “inspirational [but] [y]ou
can’t take the language so literally.” Id. So the façade engravers edited the language,
replacing the first clause with ellipses: “Every person is entitled . . . to obtain justice
freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without
delay, conformable to the law.” Hopefully, that would inspire those visiting the
courthouse without raising unreasonable expectations.
6 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 (2005); Steven
J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 509-10 (1991); Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as
a Privilege or Immunity of National Citizenship, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1477, 1484 (2008);
Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due
Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2004). Other provisions of the federal
constitution relevant to remedial rights include Article III, the Guarantee Clause, the
Habeas Corpus Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. Judith Resnik argues for a remedial
imperative based on multiple state and federal constitutional provisions. See Judith
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts,
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2822-24 (2015).
7 These efforts resonate with one another, but emphasize different textual bases.
Theories based on state constitutional provisions fail to recognize a federal
constitutional right to a remedy and the close link between the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause and remedy-guaranteeing provisions in state constitutions. See
Phillips, supra note 3, at 1310 (describing “the guarantee of a right of access to the
courts to obtain a remedy for injury” as the “most widespread and important of . . .
unique state provisions” that “contain[] rights and guarantees not found in the
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text, and precedent — lies in the final clause of the First Amendment
— the Petition Clause — which guarantees the “right of the people . . .
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”8 Scholars,9
lower courts,10 and the Supreme Court11 have repeatedly recognized
Federal Constitution”). Theories based on other provisions of the federal
constitutional fail to ground the right to a remedy in the distinctive text, history,
function, precedent, and doctrinal framework of the First Amendment.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Petition Clause has long been overshadowed by its
clausal kin. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 558 & n.4
(1999) [hereinafter Right of Access]; Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment
Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569, 569 & n. 1 (1987); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial
Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2153, 2155-57 (1998); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition
Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 15, 16 & n.2 (1993) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991)) (omitting the right to petition from account of First
Amendment rights). In recent decades, however, the right to petition has enjoyed a
quiet renaissance of judicial and scholarly attention. Influential scholarship includes.
See Andrews, supra, at 557; Mark, supra, at 2153; James E. Pfander, Sovereign
Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial
Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 899 (1997); Spanbauer, supra,
at 16. Significant Supreme Court cases include: Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S.
Ct. 2488, 2491 (2011); BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524-25
(2002); and Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 409-10 (2002).
9 See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.54,
at 1378 (7th ed. 2004); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1156 & n. 120 (1991) [hereinafter The Bill of Rights]; Andrews, Right of
Access, supra note 8, at 595-96, 589-92, nn.117, 119 (collecting scholarship); Pfander,
supra note 8, at 900; Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 63; Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of
Suits Against the Government: Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1111, 1112 (1993).
10 See Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 589-90 nn.117–18 (collecting
cases).
11 In more than twenty Supreme Court cases over the past five decades, one or
more Justices has asserted or assumed that a lawsuit is a petition, without a single
colleague disputing the premise. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2014); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 122-23 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); BE & K Constr. Co., 536 U.S. at 525; Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415
& n.12; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 406 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fla. Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Prof’l Real
Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1993);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,
896-97 (1984); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 n.9 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 244 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 n.6 (1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660
(1973); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401
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lawsuits as petitions.12 And there is a broad judicial and scholarly
consensus — which I join — that the right to petition includes a
negative right to be free from retaliation for, or suppression of,
petitioning activity.13 But scholars and jurists have generally assumed
U.S. 576, 580 (1971); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389
U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967); Bhd. R.R. Trainmen v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963). I discuss many of these cases
in Part II.D, infra, demonstrating the considerable and underappreciated support they
provide, not only for treating lawsuits as petitions, but for recognizing a First
Amendment right to a remedy.
12 However, five years ago, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488
(2011), Justices Scalia and Thomas threw down the gauntlet on lawsuits’ First
Amendment status, attacking the proposition as “quite doubtful,” id. at 2503 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2501 (Thomas, J., concurring), and
dismissing prior opinions affirming it as “vague[],” id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), “[u]nreasoned,” id. at 2501 (Thomas, J., concurring),
and “pure dictum,” id. at 2502-03 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Though this attack was profoundly mistaken, see infra Part I, the majority
added fuel to the fire with an equivocal rejoinder, alternatively characterizing lawsuits’
First Amendment status as a principle that “precedents confirm,” Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct.
at 2494, and as a “premise” upon which the “parties litigated the case.” Id. at 2494.
Justice Scalia seized on the majority’s ambivalence as a concession of lawsuits’
uncertain First Amendment status. Id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Court has never actually held that a lawsuit is a
constitutionally protected ‘Petition,’ nor does today’s opinion hold that. The Court
merely observes that ‘[t]he parties litigated the case on the premise.’” (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted)). The Guarnieri majority declined to dispute Justice
Scalia’s characterization of its holding. The confusion in Guarnieri suggests that the
Court must and will authoritatively resolve this question in a future case.
13 See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co., 536 U.S. at 536-37; Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc.,
508 U.S. at 56, 60-61; Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging. . .”: An
Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153,
1195 (1986); Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 47-48. Most published opinions have
involved claims of retaliation. The most common sanction challenged is adverse
employment action. See, e.g., Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2492; Gunter v. Morrison, 497
F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007); Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
Other sanctions include: liability under federal antitrust law, e.g., Cal. Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); liability under federal
labor law, e.g., Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); permit denial
or revocation, see, e.g., Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1312-13 (9th
Cir. 1989); adverse zoning decisions, see, e.g., EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698
F.3d 845, 864 n.14 (6th Cir. 2012); other official investigatory or enforcement actions,
see, e.g., Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 2008); costs and attorneys’
fees, see, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1755; and retaliatory bad-faith counterlitigation or prosecution, see, e.g., Hinds v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 188 F. Supp. 2d
664, 669-70 (N.D. Tex. 2002). Much of the disagreement about the right’s scope has
been internal to this purely negative framework, concerning the circumstances, if any,
under which the state can legitimately punish petitioning activity. Compare the
majority and concurring opinions in BE & K Construction Co., 536 U.S. at 516;
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that the right to petition is limited in all cases to this purely negative,
procedural right: the right to petition means only and always the right
to ask for redress — never to obtain it — even when a person petitions
a court to enforce legal rights and redress legal injuries.14 I call this
assumption the supplicatory interpretation of the Petition Clause. In
this article, I present an alternative reading, which I call the remedial
interpretation: that the right to petition includes the limited right of a
person who suffers legal injury (or a sufficient threat thereof) to
obtain a minimally adequate remedy from the courts. In short, I argue
that the First Amendment guarantees a right to a remedy.
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I presents the case for a First
Amendment right to a remedy, as a matter of history, text, and
precedent. First, I explore the historical roots of the Petition Clause. I
emphasize a point that has been overlooked in Petition Clause
scholarship to date: that the original codification of a right to petition
in Magna Carta was framed in strong mandatory, not supplicatory
terms. And, while other scholars assume that the English petitionary
right is the original antecedent to the Petition Clause, I argue that its
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 49; and California Motor Transport
Co., 404 U.S. at 508.
14 See, e.g., Minn. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984)
(“Nothing in the First Amendment . . . suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and
petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individual
communications on public issues.”); Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315,
441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (commission’s refusal to respond to employee grievances did
not violate the First Amendment); EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845,
864 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n all of the cases addressing meaningful access, the focus is
on the access to the court, not the court’s response or behavior upon receiving the
petition.”). For example, one of the nation’s leading Petition Clause scholars, Carol
Rice Andrews, concludes that the right to petition the courts “is very narrow: it
protects a person’s right only to file winning claims within the court’s jurisdiction.”
Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 562 (emphasis added). According to
Andrews, the right to petition the courts is mostly a negative right to be free from
unjustified governmental retaliation or suppression; the only positive duty the right
imposes is the limited obligation to receive a lawsuit in the minimal sense of
permitting its filing. See id. at 646-47. But according to Andrews, at the moment of
filing, the work of the Petition Clause concludes and Due Process takes over to
regulate how the court responds to the filed petition. Id. at 633-34, 646-47. In short,
Andrews defines the court access right narrowly as a procedural right of initial access
to the judicial forum. But see, e.g., Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to
Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142-43 (1986);
Pfander, supra note 8, at 905 & n.22 (citing scholarship); Spanbauer, supra note 8, at
33. Most have assumed the right is both exclusively procedural and exclusively
negative. Other have explored possibility that the right to petition includes a positive
procedural component, imposing affirmative duties on government to receive,
consider, or respond to certain petitions.
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origins must be traced both to the English petitionary right and to the
English right to a remedy. I explain that the English legal system
distinguished between the “right to petition” the King and “the right
to a remedy” from the courts because of structural features of the
British monarchy that the Framers rejected, but these two English
rights worked in tandem to ensure redress of legal injuries. The
Framers adapted these interlocking rights to the American political
system by merging them into a unified right to “petition the
Government for a redress of grievances,” which included the right of
legally injured persons to obtain a meaningful remedy from the
separate and coequal judicial branch.15
Next, I closely analyze the text and drafting history of the Petition
Clause. I explain that the word “petition” is a semantically polysemous
and pragmatically ambiguous term: Whether it is best understood to
be supplicatory or mandatory depends on contextual factors. I point to
four contextual features of the text and its drafting history that favor a
mandatory connotation: (1) the unprecedented redefinition of the
petition recipient — in stark contrast to all previous and extant
codifications and to the original language proposed — from
“Legislature” to “Government”; (2) the explicit specification of the
goal as “a redress of grievances”; (3) the separate enumeration of the
right to petition and the freedom of speech; and (4) the proposal and
consideration of more explicit right-to-a-remedy language by state
ratifying conventions and the U.S. Senate. Through this analysis, I
problematize the two primary assumptions made by proponents of the
supplicatory interpretation: that the word “petition” has a single,
unambiguous, supplicatory meaning synonymous with “beg,”
“beseech,” or “supplicate”; and that the enumeration of “the right to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances” rather than “the
right to a redress of grievances” necessarily confines the right to one of
15 Note that the Petition Clause, like the First Amendment as a whole, originally
applied only to the federal government, and was only incorporated against the states
after Reconstruction via the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the First Amendment
directly prohibits federal abridgment of the right to petition the federal courts, and
through the doctrine of incorporation prohibits state abridgement of the right to
petition state or federal courts. The Court has recognized this implicitly, but not
explicitly. Compare Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011) (applying
the Petition Clause to conduct of a state’s local political subdivision) with McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 at n.12 (2010) (citing cases incorporating every
First Amendment right except the right to petition). A complete analysis of the
present-day right to petition would consider Reconstruction, and how the meaning of
the Petition Clause may have been modified by the Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Privileges & Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. That project lies
beyond the scope of this article.
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supplication. I also explain why a purely supplicatory interpretation of
the Petition Clause would render it superfluous in light of the Speech
Clause.
Finally, I show how the remedial interpretation is consonant with
prior Supreme Court cases. In Chisholm v. Georgia,16 and Marbury v.
Madison,17 cases decided in the decade following the ratification of the
First Amendment, there was clear judicial recognition of a right to a
remedy, linked to a right to petition the courts in the new American
constitutional order. More modern lines of doctrine also provide
substantial — and often-undervalued — support for the principle that
the Petition Clause entails a remedial component for legal petitions.
In Part II, I explain the practical significance of recognizing the
remedial Petition Clause. I begin the task of translating the remedial
theory into a coherent doctrinal framework by sketching a tentative
tiered scrutiny approach to remedial access claims that flows naturally
from other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. Neutral time,
place, and manner limitations on remedial access would enjoy judicial
deference. Limitations based on the content of a lawsuit, the identity
of the plaintiff, or the governmental status of the defendant would
trigger heighted scrutiny. This tiered scrutiny approach would impose
meaningful constraints on remedy denial, but it would not upend
every rule that affects remedial access. It would not eliminate the gap
between right and remedy, but it would narrow it, and demand
justification for it. This doctrinal framework could have numerous,
significant real-world implications. Rules and practices vulnerable to
challenge under my theory include congressional restrictions on
individuals’ access to judicial remedies under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and the
Federal Arbitration Act; judicial refusals to reach the merits of lawsuits
or impose remedies when applying qualified and absolute immunity
doctrines; and state legislation capping tort damage awards.18
16

2 U.S. 419 (1793).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
18 Access to the remedial function of federal courts is also implicated by many
rules of federal courts jurisprudence, including the availability of and limitations on
federal court jurisdiction, Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308 (2005), the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 statutory cause of action, Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961), partially overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the Bivens implied cause of action, Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971). Some
of these rules reflect Supreme Court interpretations of federal constitutional
provisions such as the Eleventh Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, and Article III,
U.S. CONST. art. III., § 1 (Judicial Vesting Clause), U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2 (“Cases”
17
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Ultimately, I conclude that the history, text and judicial
interpretation of the Petition Clause all support my proposed remedial
interpretation.19
The proper interpretation of the Petition Clause will not be settled
by any one article or scholar — it will emerge from a process of
scholarly and judicial inquiry over time. My goal here is not to end the
debate about whether the Petition Clause includes a right to a remedy,
but to introduce a new perspective. I readily acknowledge that the case
for a Petition Clause right to a remedy — like any competing
interpretation — is imperfect and subject to valid critique. My
objective is to share a novel but plausible theory of the Petition
Clause, and to invite others to examine and build upon it.
I.

THEORY

This section makes the case for a First Amendment right to a
remedy as a matter of history, text, and precedent. Subpart A argues
that the First Amendment right “to petition the Government”
represents the merger of the historically related rights to petition the
King and to obtain a remedy from the courts. Subpart B argues that the
remedial theory best accounts for the precise language and drafting
history of the Petition Clause and the First Amendment as a whole.

and “Controversies” provisions and Appellate Jurisdiction Clause). Others, like
doctrines of prudential standing, absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity, and
qualified immunity for executive branch officials, do not. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (prudential standing); Camreta v.
Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (qualified immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978) (absolute judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
(absolute prosecutorial immunity).
Ultimately, courts must synthesize the First Amendment right to a remedy with
federal courts jurisprudence, which would require an intratextual analysis of the First
Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and Article III, along with the Suspension
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. XI. and the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Two competing principles will
inform this synthesis. The first is that the First Amendment right to a remedy is not
absolute, and permits remedy denial if adequately justified. Constitutional limitations
expressed in Article III and the Eleventh Amendment would constitute such
justification. On the other hand, when trying to figure out the proper scope of Article
III and the Eleventh Amendment, courts must recognize that there is a competing
constitutional imperative contained within the Petition Clause that favors a narrow
construction of these limitations on federal court jurisdiction. Beyond these
preliminary observations, a complete intratextual synthesis lies beyond the scope of
this paper, but I hope to pursue this project in subsequent articles.
19 See infra Conclusion.
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Subpart C shows that this remedial theory enjoys substantial support
from both Founding-era and modern Petition Clause case law.
A. Historical Antecedents
The Petition Clause protects “the right of the people . . . to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”20 In analyzing the
historical roots of this constitutional protection, Petition Clause
scholars have focused their attention on the English right to petition
the King and, later, Parliament, tracing that right from its earliest
origins in the centuries preceding its first codification in Magna Carta
to the time of the Founding of the United States.21 Another set of
scholars, attempting to understand state constitutional provisions
codifying a right to a remedy, have separately traced the historical
development over this same time period of the English right to a
remedy from the courts.22 These two lines of historical inquiry have
been treated as distinct projects, rather than elements of an
interrelated whole.
However, as I will describe in more detail in Part I.B, the text of the
Petition Clause modified the traditional right to petition in an important
way: it expanded the recipient subclause of the right and in so doing
expanded the right’s scope. Whereas previous codifications protected
the right to petition the King, Parliament, or the Legislature,23 the new
American guarantee protected the right to petition the Government24 —
thus encompassing petitions to the courts. I argue that this substantive
textual modification mandates a wider lens for the historical inquiry.
The historical antecedent to the Petition Clause is not only the English
right to petition, but also the English right to a remedy, which governed
petitions addressed to courts.
These two English rights predate modern separation of powers.
They developed at a time when executive, legislative, and judicial
powers were diffused across multiple institutional actors in ways that
were complex and evolving. In this era of blended or conflated
powers, the English petitionary and remedial rights were differentiated

20

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Higginson, supra note 14, at 142-49; Mark, supra note 8, at 2163-70;
Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 22-33.
22 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1009-20; Koch, supra note 4, at 349-57;
Phillips, supra note 3, 1319-24; Schuman, supra note 4, at 1199-01.
23 See infra Section I.B.4.a (discussing the intention underlying “the government”
in the Petition Clause of the Constitution).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
21
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primarily according to the institutional recipient of the petition, rather
than the function of the petition. The right to petition constrained the
King and Parliament, and the right to a remedy constrained the courts.
This separate treatment according to institutional recipient made sense
in light of features of the English political system that the Founders
decisively rejected — the sovereignty of the King, the inferiority of the
courts, and the subjecthood of the citizenry. Yet there was substantial
overlap between the function of petitions to the King or Parliament
and petitions to the courts. As English petitioning practice emerged
and evolved, there was substantial conflation between petitions
addressed to the different institutional bodies. Courts, as they
developed, received legal petitions designed to redress individual legal
grievances. But so, too, did the King and Parliament. Some petitions
addressed to the King and Parliament were in function political
petitions: they sought a change in or clarification of the law. Others,
however, were in function legal petitions, which sought to enforce
extant legal rights.
Thus the “right to a remedy” concerned legal petitions directed to
courts; the “right to petition” concerned both legal and political
petitions directed to the King and to Parliament. The American
codification of a right to petition the Government encompassed both of
these petitioning traditions, including legal and political petitions
addressed to all three branches of government in the new
constitutional order.
Expanding the historical lens of my analysis to include both the
English “right to a remedy” and the English “right to petition” bears
significant consequences. Conventional accounts of petitioning practice
that define petitioning with atextual institutional constraints implicitly
limit the scope of their inquiry in four related ways: (1) they focus
narrowly on a subset of institutional petition recipients that excludes
courts, based on recipient subclauses rejected by the Framers;25 which
leads to (2) overemphasizing political petitions and underemphasizing
legal petitions — sometimes to the point of ignoring legal petitions
completely, even those addressed to the political branches; which leads
to (3) conceptualizing the function of petitioning exclusively in terms
of participation, political responsiveness, and information provision,
and erasing the distinct function of enforcing pre-existing rights; and
(4) emphasizing the supplicatory, discretionary character of the
25 See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here is abundant historical evidence
that ‘Petitions’ were directed to the executive and legislative branches of government,
not to the courts.”).
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petitioning relationship and concluding that the right to petition was
just a negative right to be free from retaliation but not a positive
entitlement to a favorable response.26 In other words, by limiting the
inquiry in terms of (1) recipient, (2) goal, and (3) function, they
(4) limit the scope of the right.
My approach, consistent with the textual and functional innovation
of the First Amendment, addresses each of these four limitations, by
recognizing that (1) courts must be counted among the recipients of
historical petitions; (2) petitions to the King and Parliament included
both political and legal petitions; (3) legal petitions served a distinct
rights-protecting function irrespective of recipient; and (4) legal
petitions involved claims of remedial right and imposition of
corresponding remedial duties upon the petition’s recipient.
In relating the history of English petitioning practice, I necessarily
provide an extremely brief summary of a vast historical record that has
been exhaustively explored by other scholars. My primary purpose is
not to capture each detail of centuries of English history, but to
illuminate what more detailed treatments sometimes obscure: the coevolution of English remedial and petitionary practices which laid the
foundation for a new American right.
1.

The Rise of English Petitionary and Remedial Rights

Scholars trace the right to a remedy from the courts and the right to
petition the King to separate provisions of Magna Carta codified eight
centuries ago.27 But the practices of petitioning the King and accessing
remedies from his courts developed centuries before.28 Indeed, Magna
26 Some argue there is a duty to receive, consider, or respond to petitions. See
Higginson, supra note 14, at 142-43, 155; Hodgkiss, supra note 8, at 572-73, but
nobody argues there is a right to a favorable response to legal petitions. Andrews,
Right of Access, supra note 8, at 644 (“[N]o one contends that the mere right to
petition guarantees that the government will grant the petitioner’s request.”).
27 Scholars recognize Chapter 40 of the 1215 charter as the original codification of
the right to a remedy. See Heyman, supra note 6, at 535; Hoffman, supra note 4, at
1006 n.4; Koch, supra note 4, at 341; Phillips, supra note 3, at 1319-20; Schuman,
supra note 4, at 1199; Thomas, supra note 6, at 1638; Shannon M. Roesler, Comment,
The Kansas Remedy by Due Course of Law Provision: Defining a Right to a Remedy, 47 U.
KAN. L. REV. 655, 657-58 (1999). Scholars recognize Chapter 61 of the 1215 charter as
the original codification of the right to petition. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2499
(citing WILLIAM MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF
KING JOHN 467 (rev. 2d ed., 1958); Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 596
n.135; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 739, 746 (1999); Smith, supra note 13, at 1155.
28 Koch, supra note 4, at 351-53; Mark, supra note 8, at 2163.
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Carta itself was the King’s response to a petition seeking redress of
baronial grievances,29 designed in part to address dissatisfaction with
how courts and the King had been responding to petitions.30
In their earliest form, petitions to the King had a distinctly legal —
and specifically appellate — character: they sought resolution of a
claim, usually related to a private dispute over property rights,31 which
an inferior tribunal had already adjudicated.32 These appeals reflected
a dynamic of supplication rather than entitlement.33 In this way, early
petitioning practice served as a mechanism through which parties
dissatisfied with judgments of the ordinary judicial system could seek
extraordinary, discretionary relief from the King himself. It developed
as judicial power shifted from local feudal courts to a unified system of
royal courts.34
With that shift came increasing concern about how adequately royal
courts remedied legal injuries.35 The barons intended to use Magna
Carta to redress these abuses and to ensure that justice would be
dispensed based not on royal whim but on the “law of the land.”36
Magna Carta, promulgated over eight centuries ago,37 codified the
right to a remedy and the right to petition in separate provisions.38
29

Smith, supra note 13, at 1155.
See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
31 Mark, supra note 8, at 2163 n.26.
32 Id. at 2163.
33 See id.
34 In the centuries before Magna Carta, feudal justice was dispensed by a
patchwork of local courts competing for influence and fees, with most lords providing
a court for persons residing on their land. Koch, supra note 4, at 351. Henry II, who
ruled from 1154 to 1189, launched a campaign to centralize the judicial system. Id. at
352. By the time of King John’s reign (1199–1216), the balance of judicial power had
shifted decisively to royal courts. Id. at 352-53.
35 The system of royal writs was complicated and tightly controlled, denying a
remedy to those who failed to purchase the correct writ, at a price the King could vary
on a case-by-case basis, often in proportion to the value of the claim or the wealth of
the petitioner. Id. at 352-53.
36 Id. at 353.
37 The original Magna Carta was issued by King John in 1215, but the final version
was issued in 1225. In the intervening decade, King John died, his minor son (King
Henry III) ascended to the throne, issued three abridged versions, came of age, and
then finally issued the 1225 version, which became the basis for all subsequent
reaffirmations by later Plantagenet and Lancastrian monarchs. See id. at 354-56 (citing
A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 8 (1968); WILLIAM S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA, A
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 45-46, 139, 141-43, 145-154, 37683, 385, 386, 396 (2d ed. 1914); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA, LEGEND AND
LEGACY 98, 100-02, 104, 105, 107, 112-16, 241 (1965)). The 1225 version differed
30
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The right to a remedy from the courts was codified in Chapter 40 of
the original 1215 charter and read as follows: “To no one will we sell,
to no one deny or delay right or justice.”39 This language —
recognized as the first codification of the right to a remedy40 — was a
capstone provision in a document designed in significant part to
secure a judicial system that would respect and enforce individual
rights.41 We can readily trace this language from its codification in
Magna Carta to its elaboration by Sir Edward Coke in his Second
Institutes,42 to Blackstone’s restatement in his Commentaries,43 and
ultimately to state constitutional provisions operative today.44
from the original 1215 versions in two respects relevant here: (1) while the 1215
version codified due process rights in chapter 39 and a right to a remedy in chapter
40, the 1225 version combined these two chapters into a single chapter 29; and (2)
the baronial right to petition codified in Chapter 61 was omitted from the 1225
version. Yet the baronial right to petition continued in practice, evolving into a
universal right to petition. See infra Section I.A.2. For clarity, I refer to the 1215
version, with the understanding that the critical inquiry here is not which rights were
codified by which versions of Magna Carta, but rather how Magna Carta informed the
subsequent development of petitionary and remedial rights, as practiced and codified,
first in England, and then in America.
38 In this Article, I refer to the English translation of the 1215 version of Magna
Carta available through the British Library. MAGNA CARTA (Eng. 1215) (translated by
British Library), http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation.
Other scholars also rely on this version. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an
Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3107 n.59 (2015); Vincent R. Johnson, The
Ancient Magna Carta and the Modern Rule of Law: 1215 to 2015, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 4 n.8
(2015); see also HOWARD, supra note 37, at 42. Other translations exist — notably those
used in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed., 1992), and MCKECHNIE, supra note 37.
39 Chapter 29 of the 1215 charter, addressing abuses in the criminal justice
system, was the precursor to due process. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132
(2015); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J.
585, 596-97 (2009). When King Henry III reaffirmed and reissued Magna Carta a
decade later, Chapters 39 and 40 had been combined into Chapter 29. See Koch, supra
note 4, at 356.
40 See supra note 27.
41 Other provisions in Magna Carta complemented Chapter 40 in securing an
accessible, competent royal court system that would ably perform its function of
judicial remediation and rights enforcement. See MAGNA CARTA, chs. 18-19, 24, 45
(Eng. 1215). Other provisions recognize that the King and his predecessors had
violated individuals’ legal rights and guaranteed restoration of these rights and “full
justice” for these grievances (either immediately or upon conclusion of the crusades).
See id. at chs. 52-53, 57.
42 See SIR EDWARD COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 45, 55 (1642);
Roesler, supra note 27, at 657-58 & n.18 (quoting Coke).
43 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32-33.
44 See Phillips, supra note 3, at 1310-11 (describing state constitutional
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Separate from the right to a remedy provision, there is another
provision of the 1215 charter — Chapter 61 — that scholars and
courts unanimously recognize as the original codification of the right
to petition.45 But Petition Clause jurisprudence and scholarship fail to
appreciate the remedial and mandatory character of this provision.46
This right to petition is in fact a right to a remedy. Chapter 61 of the
1215 charter — the baronial right to petition — reads, in part, as
follows:
If we . . . offend in any respect against any man, or transgress
any of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the
offence is made known to four of the . . . twenty-five barons,
they shall come to us . . . to declare it and claim immediate
redress. If we . . . make no redress within forty days . . . the
four barons shall refer the matter to the rest of the twenty-five
barons, who may distrain upon and assail us in every way
possible, with the support of the whole community of the
land, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, or anything
else saving only our own person and those of the queen and
our children, until they have secured such redress as they have
determined upon. Having secured the redress, they may then
resume their normal obedience to us.47
This baronial right to petition was not supplicatory but remedial —
its purpose was to preserve the legal status quo established by Magna
Carta.48 Chapter 61 used the term “redress” four times49 and specified
what would happen if the redress was not promptly supplied: the
provisions).
45 See supra note 27.
46 See infra notes 54, 55 and accompanying text.
47 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215). In this Article, I use the British Library
translation of the Latin text, as do other legal scholars outside the Petition Clause
context. English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR., http://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation (last visited Dec. 14, 2016); see HOWARD,
supra note 37, at 42; Jackson, supra note 38, at 3107 n.59; Johnson, supra note 38, at
14. As I will discuss further below, other scholars use different translations of the
Latin text.
48 McKechnie describes the baronial right to petition as the “machinery for
enforcing all that precedes it,” “the only executive clause of the Charter, the sole
constitutional machinery,” “the procedure devised for enforcing the Charter,” and the
“procedure for redressing grievances.” MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 468.
49 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215) (“to declare it and claim immediate
redress”); id. (“If we . . . make no redress within forty days . . . . “); id. (“until they
have secured such redress as they have determined upon”); id. (“Having secured the
redress, they may then resume their normal obedience to us.”).
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barons would be relieved of their obligation of loyalty to the King and
legally entitled to wage war against him.50 Only when the King
redressed their grievances would war end and loyalty resume. To make
this threat of war credible, Chapter 61 subsequently provides that
Any man who so desires may take an oath to obey the
commands of the twenty-five barons for the achievement of
these ends, and to join with them in assailing us to the utmost
of his power. We give public and free permission to take this
oath to any man who so desires, and at no time will we
prohibit any man from taking it. Indeed, we will compel any of
our subjects who are unwilling to take it to swear it at our
command.51
Thus the baronial right to petition was not a mere procedural right,
but a substantive entitlement to redress. The petitions it contemplated
were not political petitions seeking discretionary policy change, but
legal petitions seeking enforcement of pre-existing legal rights.
Moreover, it established an explicitly mandatory relationship between
petitioner, recipient, and this rights-enforcing goal. The mandatory
redress of the baronial right to petition was the mechanism Magna
Carta selected to secure the underlying rights it established.52 For this
reason, Chapter 61 is also recognized as a precursor to the right of
revolution.53
50 See MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 468 (“John conferred upon twenty-five of his
enemies a legal right to organize rebellion, whenever in their opinion he had broken
any one of the provisions of Magna Carta. Violence might be legally used against him,
until he redressed their alleged grievances ‘to their own satisfaction.’”); id. (calling this
committee of twenty-five barons a “Committee of Rebellion”); see also SAMUEL
RAWSON GARDINER, A STUDENT’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 184 (1892) (describing these
barons as “a permanent organization for making war against the King.”).
51 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215).
52 The term “security,” or a derivative term (“secured”), is used four times, just
like the term “redress.” Other provisions of the 1215 charter refer to Chapter 61 as the
“clause for securing the peace.” MAGNA CARTA, ch. 52, 55 (Eng. 1215) (emphasis
added).
53 See ROSCOE POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF
LIBERTY 90 (1957) (“Th[e] idea [of a right of revolution] has a long history. Chapter
61 of Magna Carta recognizes a right of revolution or rebellion and provides for an
orderly exercise of it . . . .”); George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 845 (1992) (noting “the great
right of revolution dramatically exercised in Magna Carta”); Lawson & Seidman,
supra note 27, at 746 (“[T]he barons were given what amounts to a legal right of
revolution.”); Jordan J. Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and
Related Forms of Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545,
561 n.67 (1983). The logic of the baronial right to petition is also reflected in the
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Petition Clause jurisprudence and scholarship recognize Chapter 61
as the original codification of the right to petition, but characterize
Chapter 61 in procedural, supplicatory terms, by translating the Latin
text as guaranteeing the right to “ask” for redress,54 and then omitting
or de-emphasizing the latter portion of the Chapter addressing what
happens if the King fails to timely provide that redress.55
The relevant Latin word — petent56 — is a conjugated form of the
verb peto,57 which has multiple related meanings — some more
supplicatory, some more obligatory. Peto could be interpreted as to
“beg, beseech, ask, request, desire, entreat.”58 But it could alternatively
be interpreted as to “demand, seek, require,”59 or more specifically to
“demand or claim at law, to bring an action to recover, to sue for any
Declaration of Independence, a document drafted to justify to the world the Founders’
decision to rebel against Britain. After enumerating grievances against the Crown, the
Declaration of Independence states, “In every stage of these Oppressions We have
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been
answered only by repeated injury.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S.
1776); Smith, supra note 13, at 1173; Higginson, supra note 14, at 155 n.92.
54 See infra note 62 (citing to authorities that follow the “right to ‘ask’”
translation).
55 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 8, at 2164 & n.29 (characterizing baronial petitions
as “notifying [the King] of his failure to observe the pledges contained in the Great
Charter,” and failing to quote the portion of Chapter 61 describing legal consequence
of royal failure to timely provide redress (emphasis added)). In one of her four articles
identifying Chapter 61 as the first codification of the right to petition, Carol Rice
Andrews acknowledges that if the King failed to redress a baronial petition, “the
barons could seize the King’s property until the wrong ‘has been redressed.’” Andrews,
Right of Access, supra note 8, at 639 n.279 (quoting HOLT, supra note 38, at 471). But
the relevant language is not quoted, no mention is made of the legal right to rebellion,
the provision is characterized as imposing only a “duty to respond,” id., and petent is
translated as ask in a separate footnote. Compare Carol Rice Andrews, Motive
Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 669 &
n.13 (2000) [hereinafter Motive Restrictions] (describing the petitionary right as a
“procedure” by which barons could “ask” for redress (quoting HOLT, supra note 38, at
471)), with Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 639 n.279 (“[T]he King
apparently did have a duty to respond under the original 1215 Magna Carta: the
barons had a right to petition the King for redress of the King’s breaches of the other
provisions of the Magna Carta, and, if he did not, the barons could seize the King’s
property until the wrong ‘has been redressed.’” (quoting HOLT, supra note 38, at 471)).
56 The critical Latin phrase is: “proponentes nobis excessum; petent ut excessum
illum sine dilacione faciamus emendari.” Magna Carta, LATIN LIBR. (emphasis added),
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/magnacarta.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2016).
57 Peto, OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (P. G. W. Glare ed., 1st ed. 1982). Petent is the
third-person plural, future, indicative form of the verb. The present infinitive is petere. Id.
58 Peto, A LATIN DICTIONARY (Charlton T. Lewis & Charles Short eds., 1879),
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=peto.
59 Id.
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thing.”60 Sir James Clarke Holt, an English medieval historian
renowned for his work on Magna Carta, favored the supplicatory
reading and translated petent as “ask.”61 Petition Clause scholars in
turn have favored the Holt translation.62 But other translations of
Magna Carta translate petent as “claim”63 or “demand.”64 Legal

60

Id.
See HOLT, Manuscript Cii of Magna Carta, in MAGNA CARTA, supra note 38, at
448, 469-71 (“[The] barons . . . shall bring it to our notice and ask that we have it
redressed without delay.”) (translation from text compiled by C. Bemont, Chartes des
libertes anglaises (1892)).
62 See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The “Difficult Constitutional
Question” of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
1299, 1303 n.14 (2003) (relying on Holt’s translation of petent to ask); Carol Rice
Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated Suits, Rule 11, and the First
Amendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1, 49 n.214 (2001) (same); Andrews, Motive
Restrictions, supra note 55, at 669 n.13 (same); Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8,
at 598 n.135 (same); Mark, supra note 8, at 2164 n.29 (same). Courts have also
favored this interpretation. See, e.g., San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 443
n.22 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated by Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379
(2011); Lahmann v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 121 P.3d 671, 680 n.6
(Or. 2005) (quoting SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 21 (Richard L. Perry, ed., 1959)).
63 See, e.g., CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA: MANUSCRIPTS AND MYTHS 54 (2002)
(translating “petent” as “claim”); Shruti Rajagopalan, Magna Carta Revisited:
Parchment, Guns, and Constitutional Order, 47 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. S53, S58 (2016)
(same); English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR., http://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation (last visited Dec. 14, 2016) (“[T]o
declare it and claim immediate redress.”). Claire Breay leads the medieval manuscripts
section of the British Library, which has had in its repository since 1753 two of the
four surviving original manuscripts of the 1215 Magna Carta. See Making History: Four
Original Surviving Magna Carta Manuscripts Are Brought Together for the First Time,
BRIT. LIBR. (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/press-releases/2015/february/fouroriginal-surviving-magna-carta-manuscripts-are-brought-together-for-the-first-time;
see also People: Claire Breay, BRIT. LIBR. (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/people/
experts/clairebreay. Claire Breay also serves as a co-investigator for the Magna Carta
Project. Personnel: Historical Researchers, MAGNA CARTA PROJECT, http://
magnacartaresearch.org/about/personnel (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).
64 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 397 (Daniel
Barstow Magraw, Andrea Martinez & Roy E. Brownell II eds., 2014); THOMAS WOOD
STEVENS, MAGNA CARTA: A PAGEANT DRAMA 70 (1928) (“declaring the offence, and shall
demand speedy amends for the same.”); Magna Carta 1215: Suffix A, MAGNA CARTA
PROJECT,
http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/magna_carta_1215/Suffix_A
(last
visited Dec. 15, 2016) (noting the barons’ duty to “set[] forth the transgression, and
demand that we have it reformed without delay”). The Magna Carta Project is a
collaboration between the British Library and British universities launched to freely
disseminate “texts, translations and expert commentaries” on Magna Carta in
preparation for its 800th anniversary. See About the Magna Carta Project, MAGNA
CARTA PROJECT, http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/about/aboutproject (last visited Dec.
15, 2016). The Magna Carta Project refers to Chapter 61 as Suffix A.
61
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scholarship outside the Petition Clause context favors these more
obligatory translations and characterizes Chapter 61 in more
mandatory, remedial terms.65 That Chapter 61 is interpreted in
procedural, supplicatory terms when analyzed in conjunction with the
Petition Clause suggests the power of the prevailing supplicatory
framing of the First Amendment right to petition. This may be a case
where modern framing is informing our reading of historical practice,
rather than historical practice informing our interpretation of the
Petition Clause. The better reading of petent is surely “claim” or
“demand,” because Chapter 61 clearly contemplates the barons
presenting demands, not mere requests. This textual ambiguity
regarding the Latin term petent in Magna Carta is analogous to the
textual ambiguity regarding the English term “petition” in the First
Amendment. For while some translate petent as “ask,” and others
translate petent as “claim” or “demand,” a third set of scholars simply
translate petent as “petition.”66 This interpretive dissensus powerfully
demonstrates that the verb “petition,” like its Latin ancestor peto, is an
instance of polysemy, where a single term bears multiple distinct but
related meanings.67
Magna Carta thus contained two related but distinct provisions:
Chapter 40’s right to a remedy from the courts, and Chapter 61’s
baronial right to petition the King. Note that the difference between
65 See, e.g., Sally E. Hadden, Magna Carta for the Masses: An Analysis of EighteenthCentury Americans’ Growing Familiarity with the Great Charter in Newspapers, 94 N.C.
L. REV. 1681, 1721 (2016) (“The right of petition that men believed was protected in
Magna Carta was more correctly the right to ‘claim immediate redress’ should the king
give offense (chapter 61) . . . .” (quoting DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 44-45
(2015))); Robert E. Hall, Remonstrance — Citizen’s Weapon Against Government’s
Indifference, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1427 (1990) (“Chapter 61 insured the enforcement
of the rights granted by establishing an enforceable right of petition.” (citing
MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 545, 547)); Del Wright, Jr., Bogus Refunds & Bad
Penalties: The Feckless and Fixable Refund Penalty System, 48 AKRON L. REV. 547, 583
n.156 (2015) (barons had a duty to “declare [the offence] and claim immediate
redress”) (translation source unclear); Steven M. Richman, Magna Carta — Its Essence
and Effect on International Law, N.J. LAW. MAG., June 2015, at 5, 6 (“Chapter 61 (Suffix
A) provided the remedies section, so to speak, setting forth a procedure for remedying
default by the king . . . .”).
66 See, e.g., RANDY J. HOLLAND, MAGNA CARTA: MUSE & MENTOR 246
(2014) (“[L]aying open the grievance, [the barons] shall petition to have it redressed
without delay.”); MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 467 (“[L]aying the transgression
before us, [the barons shall] petition to have that transgression redressed without
delay.”); RAY STRINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD OF FREEDOM 241 (1966)
(“[M]aking known to us the excess committed, [the barons shall] petition that we
cause that excess to be redressed without delay.”).
67 I return to this critical point in my textual analysis. Infra Section I.B.1.
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these two rights was not that the right to petition was procedural while
the right to a remedy was substantive. Both were substantive,
obligatory, and remedial in character; both provided mechanisms to
protect other underlying rights, and both emphasized a speedy
remedy.68 If anything, the right to petition was more remedial than the
right to a remedy because only the baronial right to petition entailed a
corresponding legal right of rebellion if the King failed to provide
redress. The difference between the two rights concerned who could
exercise them and whom they constrained. The right to a remedy was
universal and individual. Any single person could exercise it. The
right to petition, however, was baronial and representative. Only
selected barons, acting together, could exercise it. Though both
provisions use the royal “we,” the right to a remedy was intended and
understood only to constrain the royal courts within their limited
sphere of operation, while the right to petition directly constrained the
King. The right to a remedy was designed to redress violations by
neighbors, while the right to petition was designed to redress
transgressions by the King or his agents.
These distinctions reflected the power dynamics inherent in the
relationships between the King, the barons, the courts, and the people.
The courts were subordinate to the King and their power was limited.
For that reason, the right to a remedy was inadequate for the barons
— they wanted direct access to the King. The barons, who could
withhold taxes or rebel, posed the real political threat to the King, and
they therefore enjoyed greater remedial rights. In terms of Albert
Hirschman’s framework of voice, exit, and loyalty,69 Magna Carta’s
two-tiered remedial system, with a baronial right to petition stronger
than the universal right to a remedy from the courts, reflected the
greater threat of exit posed by barons as opposed to common
subjects.70
68 Compare MAGNA CARTA, ch. 40 (Eng. 1215) (“To no one will we sell, to no one
deny or delay right or justice.” (emphasis added)), with MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng.
1215) (“[The barons] shall come to us . . . to declare it and claim immediate redress. If
we . . . make no redress within forty days, . . . the twenty-five barons . . . may distrain
upon and assail us . . . .” (emphasis added)).
69 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (presenting influential
framework suggesting three fundamental options available to a citizen facing
government oppression: exit (rebellion or expatriation), voice (protest, lobbying, and
voting) or loyalty (hopeful attachment)).
70 Magna Carta, and the baronial right to petition, came about because the barons,
dissatisfied with their voice and loyalty options, elected to withhold taxes and go to
war against the King. The barons successfully used this exit option to extract Magna
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From this starting point, the right to petition the King and the right
to a remedy from the courts would evolve along with the English
political system and legal culture. The explicit quid pro quo between
baronial loyalty and baronial rights would evolve into a broader legal
theory of royal legitimacy predicated on the King’s protection of the
rights of all his subjects. The expectation that the King would enforce
rights and redress legal injuries would evolve from the explicit
consideration for baronial loyalty to the philosophical justification for
every subject’s allegiance to the King. As John Locke would put it four
centuries after Magna Carta, the diminution of liberty that
accompanies man’s departure from a state of nature is compensated for
by the greater security afforded by government’s obligation to enforce
natural rights.71 The right to petition the King would evolve from a
baronial and representative right to a universal and individual right.
From their differentiated origins, the right to petition the King and the
right to a remedy from the courts would co-evolve into what
Blackstone would later characterize as a tightly linked pair of
“auxiliary subordinate”72 rights that worked in tandem to protect
every Englishman’s primary rights to personal security, liberty and
property. The First Amendment would complete this co-evolution by
merging the two rights into one.
2.

The Evolution of English Petitionary and Remedial Rights

The centuries following Magna Carta saw evolution in petitioning
practice, in the structure of the courts, and in the King’s response to
petitions, with the effect that remedial responses to legal petitions
became increasingly universal, regularized, and mandatory. This
history suggests that it is problematic to analyze petitioning practice
based on the recipient of the petition; it must be analyzed based on the
function of the petition. One of the key features of this evolutionary
period was a continued conflation of powers between governmental
Carta from the King as the price of their loyalty. See generally MCKECHNIE, supra note
37. In this way, the baronial right to petition merely formalized the pre-existing
political dynamic between the King and the barons.
71 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 267-68 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also Goldberg, supra note 6, at 541
(discussing Locke’s contributions to social contract theory). Locke’s theory heavily
influenced Blackstone and the Founders. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54 (1967); GARY ROSEN, AMERICAN COMPACT:
JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDING 5, 108 n.40 (1999); Goldberg, supra
note 6, at 547-48.
72 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140-41.
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actors: judicial powers were exercised by courts, King, and Parliament;
quasi-judicial procedures were implemented in Parliament and by the
King; and due to a changing court system, petitions once addressed to
the King were later addressed to his Courts of Equity.
In the six centuries following Magna Carta, there was a vast history
of political petitioning concerned not with remedying legal injury or
enforcing preexisting rights, but rather with changing the law and
communicating the public will to the King and, later, to Parliament.73
Such political petitions often received favorable responses, but such
responses were not guaranteed.74
But the analysis changes when we shift our focus to legal petitions.
If an individual believed that someone violated his legal rights, what
would he do? To which institutional actor would he turn? What was
the common understanding of an individual’s second-order right to
enforce his primary rights — in other words, to obtain a remedy for
legal injury?
The answers to these questions were complex and fluid. The
procedural mechanisms for legal petitioning were multi-institutional:
they included petitioning the courts, the King, and, later, Parliament.
And these procedural mechanisms were also dynamic. The relevant
institutional actors, and the manner in which they responded,
underwent significant evolution. Consider one prominent example of
this dynamism. In response to increasing numbers of petitions, the
73 See Mark, supra note 8, at 2166-67 (“The petitions did not recognize fine a
priori distinctions in categories of judicial, legislative, or executive authority, nor did
they recognize a deep theoretical gulf between public and private grievances.”).
Special interest groups would petition the King, not to enforce preexisting legal rights,
but to request changes in law. See Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 22-23 (“[T]he barons, as
representatives of the nobility, were granted a personal audience with the King . . . to
present their written petition in exchange for their promise to finance the
government.”). Linkages — explicit and implicit — developed between the King’s
response to these petitions and the willingness with which special interest groups
pledged taxes and military service to the King. See id. at 22-23, 25. This dynamic of
political petitioning may have evolved into the British Parliament. See id. at 23 n.44.
When Parliament became institutionalized, people started petitioning Parliament as
well. Mark, supra note 8, at 2166 n.34. The lines between political and legal petitions
remained blurred. See id. at 2166-69. Sometimes Parliament concluded that the
petitioner was not entitled to relief under extant law, but that the law itself should be
changed or clarified. In this case, Parliament asked the King to change the law.
Parliament began bundling these requests to the King, and preconditioning funds on
adequate responses. Id. at 2167-68. This was the beginning of an institutionalized
process of legislation. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1156.
74 See Mark, supra note 8, at 2170-71 (“The [seventeenth] century’s upheavals [in
English politics] included powerful and unfavorable responses to certain
petitions . . . .”).
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King began referring legal, appellate petitions to his Chancellor, who
began developing a routinized system for addressing them.75
Eventually, this system evolved into the Chancery Court,76 which in
turn became increasingly independent from the King.77 In this way,
petitions once addressed directly to the King were later addressed to a
court of equity — a court that was subject to the norm that, absent
adequate justification, the violation of a right necessitated a remedy.78
The multi-institutional character of legal petitioning practice
generated procedural complexity, institutional choice, and
institutional competition. Petitioners asserting legal grievances could
often select among multiple fora — for example, Parliament, a court of
law, or one of multiple courts of equity — and they made that choice
based on an estimation, depending on the particular claim, of which
forum would offer the most advantageous relief.79 Intense
jurisdictional competition between different institutional recipients
promoted receptiveness to individual petitioners. From this multiinstitutional competitive dynamic emerged a remedial imperative —
an increasingly broad and robust recognition that, absent adequate
justification, a meritorious legal claim triggers a petitioner’s right to a
remedy and government’s duty to provide one. Parliament’s
competitive institutional interest in resolving petitions developed into
an institutional obligation to do so, particularly in the case of legal
petitions, for which Parliament exercised quasi-judicial functions and
adopted quasi-judicial procedures.80 Courts of law captured this
remedial imperative in the legal maxim of ubi jus, ibi remedium —
“where there is a right, there should be a remedy.”81 Courts of equity
developed the analogous equitable maxim that “equity will not suffer a
wrong without a remedy.”82 And in the centuries-long turf war waged
between courts of law and courts of equity,83 the most fundamental
75

See Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
77 See POMEROY, supra note 1, at 3-4.
78 Id. at 200-01 (discussing the equitable maxim that “equity will not suffer a
wrong without a remedy”).
79 Mark, supra note 8, at 2168 n.50.
80 See id. at 2167 n.42, 2168 n.46.
81 Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 1485-86 (“Few propositions of law are as
basic today — and were as basic and universally embraced two hundred years ago —
as the ancient legal maxim, ubi jus, ibi remedium: Where there is a right, there should
be a remedy.”).
82 POMEROY, supra note 1, at 200-01.
83 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 6
(concise 4th ed. 2012) (“The line between law and equity is largely the result of a
76
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principle to emerge aligned jurisdictional scope with remedial efficacy:
courts of equity would only intervene where the petitioner could
demonstrate that there was no adequate remedy in the courts of law.84
By 1642, Sir Edward Coke had elaborated upon Magna Carta’s
protection of the right to a remedy in the following terms:
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either justice or right. . . . And therefore, every subject of this
realme, for injury done to him in bonis, terris, vel persona, by
any other subject, be he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free, or
bond, man, or woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed,
excommunicated, or any other without exception, may take
his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and
right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully
without any deniall, and speedily without delay.85
Six decades later, the famous case of Ashby v. White emphasized the
reciprocity of rights and remedies:
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to
vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the
exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing to
imagine a right without a remedy; for . . . want of right and
want of remedy are reciprocal. . . . Where a man has but one
remedy to come at his right, if he loses that he loses his right.86
The remedial right extended even, in somewhat altered form, to
petitions against the King himself. The “petition of right” emerged as a
mechanism by which English subjects would petition the King directly
to redress legal wrongs and ask him, as matter of mercy or conscience,
to consent to suit in the courts of equity.87 Royal consent to suit
became increasingly fictionalized over time, and English subjects were
increasingly able to get a remedy from the King’s officers or even from

bureaucratic fight for turf; each court took as much jurisdiction as it could get.”).
84 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 687, 694 (1990); Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme
Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 212
(2000).
85 SIR EDWARD COKE, SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 45,
55 (1642). The Supreme Court has noted that Coke’s Institutes “were read in the
American Colonies by virtually every student of law.” Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128,
2133 (2015) (quoting Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225 (1967)).
86 Ashby v. White (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137.
87 Pfander, supra note 8, at 909.
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the King himself.88 Chief Justice Marshall explicitly recognized this
tight link between petitioning practice and mandatory remedies when
he stated in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]n Great Britain the king himself is
sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply
with the judgment of his court.”89 As petitioning practice matured, the
royal response to these legal petitions moved away from royal whim
and towards regularity and rights enforcement.90
While the English legal system distinguished between the right to a
remedy from the courts and the right to petition the King and
Parliament, these rights worked in tandem to vindicate legal rights in
the English context of dynamic, multi-institutional choice and
competition. This unified and complementary relationship between
the English right to a remedy and the English right to petition is
captured most explicitly in Blackstone’s Commentaries, a treatise that
profoundly influenced the Founders.91 Blackstone described both
rights as “auxiliary subordinate” rights, which “protect and maintain
inviolate” the primary rights to personal security, liberty, and
property.92
Blackstone enumerated five “auxiliary subordinate” rights: (1) the
constitution, powers, and privileges of Parliament; (2) the limitation
of the King’s prerogative; (3) the right to a remedy from the courts;
(4) the right to petition the King or either house of Parliament for the

88 See id. at 909-12 (providing a history of the types of remedies available from the
king or the king’s officers). The famous line “the King can do no wrong,” 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254, was both a limitation on the King’s prerogative and
a constraint on suing the King directly instead of his ministers; it did not mean that
the King could act with impunity, no matter how oppressive or illegal his actions. See
Goldberg, supra note 6, at 553 n.143. For a discussion of how a First Amendment
right to a remedy would apply to the Eleventh Amendment and non-constitutional
governmental immunity doctrines, see supra note 18.
89 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
90 See Pfander, supra note 8, at 909-21 (describing the evolution for different types
of remedies).
91 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 226
(1998) (“Even more significant, members of the Thirty-ninth Congress regularly
linked the Bill of Rights with the classic common-law rights of individuals exemplified
in Blackstone . . . .”); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 16 (1975) (“No one could avoid the influence of Blackstone. Even
Jefferson, distrusting the commentator’s politics, had to concede that the work
excelled in its lucid, almost too easy, exposition of the common law.”); Goldberg,
supra note 6, at 550-51, 560 (“With certain heresies excised, the Commentaries
provided the basic text for late-colonial and early-American legal education and
practice.”).
92 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *137-39.
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redress of grievances; and (5) the right to bear arms.93 Blackstone’s last
three rights are conceptually related. The interlocking rights to a
remedy, to petition, and to bear arms reflected the same political logic
of voice and exit that animated the baronial right to petition in the
original charter of 1215.94 They were based on a conception of the
political order that linked the legitimacy of government to the
adequacy of its rights-enforcing capacity. If a person’s underlying
primary rights were threatened or violated, the person’s first step was
to seek a remedy from the courts. If for some reason, the courts were
unable to adequately perform this function, the person could petition
the King or Parliament:
4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or
infringement of the rights beforementioned, which the
ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still
remains a fourth subordinate right appertaining to every
individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either
house of parliament, for the redress of grievances.95
Petitioning was designed to secure remedies in the rare cases where
the courts could not. Significantly, Blackstone characterized the right
to petition in explicitly legal terms, as an extension to Parliament and
the King of the right to a remedy in the courts. Finally, if petitioning
itself did not vindicate a person’s primary rights, the person could bear
arms — to protect himself directly or to rise up against the
government. This final auxiliary subordinate right is obviously a
precursor to the Second Amendment and the concept of an armed
militia as a guarantor of liberty and bulwark against oppression.96
If we accept a supplicatory reading of the Petition Clause, each of
these auxiliary subordinate rights is reflected in the federal Constitution
— except the right to a remedy. 97 Under my remedial theory of the
93

Id. at *136-39.
See supra notes 69, 70 and accompanying text.
95 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138-39.
96 See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104
YALE L.J. 995, 1009-11 (1995) (reviewing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)).
97 The first two are structural features of the English system that find parallels in
the law-making power of Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, and the constitutional
limitations on executive power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Robert J. Reinstein,
The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009). The last three rights are
individual, with the fifth right analogous to the Second Amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend II.
94
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Petition Clause, however, all five auxiliary subordinate rights are
reflected in the federal Constitution, with the First Amendment Petition
Clause incorporating both the third and the fourth rights. When the
Framers changed the recipient subclause of the Petition Clause from
“the Legislature” to “the Government,”98 the rights to two types of
petitions directed at two different recipients, including the remedial
expectations attached to them, were merged into one.
***
These historical roots of the petitionary and remedial rights, predating Magna Carta and traceable forward to Blackstone’s
Commentaries, demonstrate a co-evolution of two closely linked
rights, both of which served at least a partially remedial function, but
each of which was directed at a different institutional actor. Early
American codifications of these rights mirrored the British practice.
Prior to the ratification of the First Amendment, colonial charters and
then state constitutions often contained protections for the right to
petition the Legislature and a separately enumerated right to a remedy
from the courts.99
When the Framers merged the institutional recipient of the Petition
Clause — changing it from “the Legislature” to “the Government” —
they encompassed petitions to the judiciary, which were previously
governed by the English right to a remedy. In so doing, the Framers
acted against the backdrop of a deep-seated understanding that
petitions directed toward the courts would, absent adequate
justification, result in a remedy, and that even petitions directed
toward the King or Parliament, when legal or appellate in nature,
would result in remedial action where merited, as well. This historical
co-evolution provides substantial support for the remedial
interpretation of the Petition Clause, which placed duties on all
branches of a now co-equal government in the new American
Republic.
B. Text and Drafting History
With this historical background in mind, I now turn to analyze the
constitutional text ultimately adopted by the Framers of the First
98

See infra Part I.B.
See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 403 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Andrews); Andrews, Right of Access,
supra note 8, at 604 n.159 (citing constitutional provisions from Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire).
99
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Amendment: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right
of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”100
As I conduct this analysis, I recognize that one intuitive reading of
these words — and, indeed, the prevailing interpretation of the text to
date — is that they guarantee a right that is supplicatory and
procedural in nature: that the right to petition means only and always
the right to ask for redress, without any assurance that redress will be
forthcoming. I call this interpretation the supplicatory interpretation. A
proponent of the supplicatory interpretation would assert — or
assume — that the word “petition” is a synonym of “ask,” “beg,” or
“beseech”; that “petition” entails an entreaty rather than an
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I. I focus my reading on the heart of the Petition Clause,
the final nine words that protect the right “to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” Read as a whole, however, the first eleven words — “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . .” — suggest three additional
interpretive principles I use in other portions of my analysis. The specification of
“Congress” as the restrained institution reminds us of the federal orientation of the
Bill of Rights. See infra Section I.B.6 (suggesting federalism concerns with a standalone right-to-remedy provision). The phrase “shall make no law . . . abridging”
applies not only to the petitionary right, but to the right of assembly, the freedom of
speech, and the freedom of the press, suggesting a coherence among all First
Amendment protections. See infra Part II.A (suggesting the need for a doctrinal
framework for the remedial right to petition that coheres with other First Amendment
doctrines). The phrase “the right of the people” suggests an adaptation of pre-existing
historical rights. See supra Part I.A (looking to the historical development of the
petitioning practice).
The First Amendment refers to “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” U.S. CONST. amend. I. For this
reason, some refer not to two distinct clauses — the Assembly Clause and the Petition
Clause — but to a unitary “Petition and Assembly Clause,” Jack N. Rakove, The
Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 113
(2000), or the “assembly/petition clause,” Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77
WASH. L. REV. 639, 713 (2002). Mazzone has argued that “we should understand
assembly and petition to belong together,” id. at 712, given the singular “right of the
people” and the conjunctive “and,” id. at 712-13, and the historical link between
petitioning and assembly, see id. at 721-29. However, John Inazu has demonstrated
that this conflation of petition and assembly is unpersuasive as a matter of text and
drafting history. See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV.
565, 574-77 (2010). The First Amendment “does not limit assembly to the purposes
of petitioning the government.” Id. at 576. Just as people can assemble without
petitioning, an individual can petition without assembling, most obviously by
petitioning a court to redress a legal grievance. The two linguistically distinct clauses
protect two conceptually distinct rights. The impulse to conflate assembly and
petitioning into a single right suggests how powerfully the right to petition is
associated with political petitions addressed to legislatures as opposed to legal
petitions addressed to courts.
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entitlement. Such a proponent would further argue that the choice of
indirect language, guaranteeing a “right to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances” rather than a “right to a redress of grievances,”
renders it a procedural right to ask for a remedy and not a substantive
right to get a remedy.
There is, however, a competing interpretation of the text: that in the
specific context of legal petitions, these words encompass the
substantive right of a legally injured person to ask for and obtain
redress. I call this interpretation the remedial interpretation. In
elucidating the remedial interpretation, I explain that the word
“petition” bears two ambiguities — one semantic and one pragmatic
— that make it supplicatory in some contexts and mandatory in
others. I then identify four contextual factors that point to a
mandatory, remedial reading of the word “petition” as it is used in the
First Amendment: the deliberate and unprecedented broadening of the
petition recipient from “the Legislature” to “the Government” (thus
encompassing courts); the specification of “the redress of grievances”
as the petition goal; the enumeration of a separate Speech Clause that
already protects supplicatory communications; and the Framers’
consideration (and ultimate rejection) of more explicit remedyguaranteeing language.
1.

The Ambiguity of “Petition”

Whether the word “petition” in the Petition Clause has a
supplicatory or mandatory meaning depends on two linguistic
ambiguities. First, as a matter of semantics, the word “petition”
presents a case of polysemy. It is a single term that bears multiple,
related meanings. One of these meanings is supplicatory (as in “beg”),
but one is mandatory (as in “claim”).
Take the various entries for the verb “petition” in the Oxford
English Dictionary. Some are supplicatory: “[t]o make a request or
supplication to”; “to ask humbly”; “[t]o solicit, ask, or beg for.”101
Others connote formality as opposed to supplication: “to address a
written petition to (an authority) in respect of a particular cause”; “to
make a formal application to (a court)”; “[t]o address or present a
petition”; “to file a petition with a court.”102 Note that two of these
latter four definitions explicitly contemplate a court as the petition’s

101 Petition, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141859
(last visited October 20, 2016).
102 Id.
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recipient, and three of them define the verb “petition” in terms of the
noun “petition.”
Turn to the entries for the noun “petition” and you will find even
starker evidence of polysemy. Again, some entries are supplicatory:
“[a] supplication, entreaty, or prayer”; “[a] solemn and humble prayer
to God”; “[a] supplicatory clause in a prayer”; “an entreaty, esp. to a
sovereign or superior.”103 But another entry, focusing specifically on
petitions to courts, emphasizes formality and redress instead of
supplication: “[a] formal written application made to a court, setting
out facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks to some legal
remedy or relief.”104 Still other entries are themselves subject to
multiple related interpretations, occupying some intermediate and
indeterminate point along the supplicatory–obligatory continuum:
“[t]he action of formally asking, supplicating, or requesting; the action
of submitting a petition. to make petition: to ask, supplicate, or
request formally”; “a formal written request or supplication,
(now) esp. one signed by many people, appealing to an individual or
group in authority (as a sovereign, legislature, administrative body,
etc.) for some favour, right, or mercy, or in respect of a particular
cause.”105 Notably, one entry defines the noun petition as “the thing
asked or petitioned for” as in “to have (also receive) one’s petition.”106
The polysemy of “petition” is further revealed by its etymology and
listed synonyms. The English verb “petition” derives from the Latin
verb “peto,” a conjugated form of which is used in the very first
codification of the right to petition in the 1215 Magna Carta.107 In that
document, the Latin verb is clearly used to refer to a demand rather
than a request, and the best English interpretation is “to claim” or “to
demand,” but some scholars of Magna Carta have instead interpreted
the verb as “to ask.” The synonyms for the verb “petition” listed by the
Oxford English Dictionary span the entirety of the supplicatory–
obligatory continuum: address; ask; beseech; bid; conjure; crave;
desire; entreat; implore; imprecate; invoke; mendicate; move; nurn;
plead; pray; request; require; requisite; seek; solicit; speer; supplicate;
tell; wish; and yearn. So do the listed synonyms for the noun
“petition.”

103 Petition, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141858
(last visited January 19, 2017).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See supra Section I.A.1.
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Thus, “petition” is a member of a group of conceptually-related
words that describe an action taken by an individual who is trying to
obtain something from another individual or institution. This group of
words is a particularly rich source of polysemy: The effort to obtain
the goal sought could be characterized alternatively as a request or a
demand. At one end of the supplicatory–obligatory continuum are
words such as “beseech” and “pray,”108 which connote a low level of
enforcement power; at the other end are words such as “command”
and “require” which clearly place an obligation on the recipient to
obey. Words such as “petition” and “claim” lie somewhere in the
middle; they might plausibly signify either a request or a demand. The
extent to which these words entail an expectation of obtaining what is
being asked for depends on the context. Take the word “claim.” One
meaning is akin to an assertion: “The politician claimed that she was
the best candidate.” Another meaning suggests a right to obtain the
thing sought: “She claimed her prize.” The meaning varies with
context.
The meaning of the word “petition” thus varies depending on the
context; to petition a court of law signifies something distinct and less
obviously supplicatory than to petition another individual or
institution. Sometimes, whether the word “petition” entails an
entitlement to the petition goal depends on the entity to whom the
petition is addressed (the petition recipient). When one petitions the
gods, the word has an obviously and necessarily supplicatory meaning.
When one petitions a court — an institution bound by the rule of law
and designed to consider and resolve questions of individual legal
right — the word often takes on a mandatory significance.
Moreover, whether the word “petition” entails an entitlement to the
petition goal also varies depending on the goal sought. Sometimes the
word “petition” is used in a context in which the agent has a right not
only to ask the recipient for some goal, but the underlying substantive
right to obtain the goal if certain criteria are satisfied. Someone who
“petitions” for a writ of mandamus or for a writ of habeas corpus is
entitled to that writ if her petition has legal merit.109 Other examples
108 Note that sometimes even these highly supplicatory words are used nonliterally and function as commands.
109 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.15 (2016) (“The writ of habeas
corpus shall be granted without delay by the judge or court receiving the petition,
unless it be manifest . . . that the party is entitled to no relief whatever.”); In re Stake
Ctr. Locating, Inc., 731 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In reviewing a CVRA
mandamus petition, we . . . ‘must issue the writ whenever we find that the district
court’s order reflects an abuse of discretion or legal error.’” (emphasis added) (citing
Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006))); Weaver v. Foltz,
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abound.110 By contrast, consider a petition for certiorari lodged in the
Supreme Court. Because certiorari is discretionary, there is no
mandatory obligation upon the Court to grant the petition. But note
that this discretion is suggested by the qualification “for certiorari”
and does not follow ineluctably from the term “petition” alone; it
flows from the contextual marker following it.
Second, as a matter of pragmatics, the connotation of the word
“petition” may depart from its semantic meaning when used in certain
cultural contexts. Like many other conceptually-related terms, the
word “petition,” even when it is unambiguously supplicatory on a
semantic level, may be used in a context where it is pragmatically
understood as a demand.
For example, when a boss says to an employee, “Could I ask you to
take care of that by the end of the day?” or when a police officer says
to a motorist, “I’m asking you to please step out of the car,” we
understand these sentences not as supplicatory requests but as polite
commands made by individuals in higher positions of authority in a
manner that de-emphasizes the power inequity between those making
and those receiving the instruction. The ubiquitous cultural memes “I
wasn’t asking” and “That wasn’t a question” are necessary and
commonly arise because of the inherent uncertainty in determining
whether a particular request is supplicatory or mandatory —
particularly when higher authorities couch demands as requests.
Similar pragmatic ambiguities inhere when the individual seeking a
favorable action is less powerful than the person being asked, due to
conventions of respect owed to certain authority figures. As discussed
above,111 as petitioning practice evolved in England over time, and as
petitions that were once resolved as a matter of grace became
increasingly routinized and necessitated a resolution as a matter of
right, it remained of the utmost importance to phrase these demands
888 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 1989) (“A writ of habeas corpus must issue to any
habeas petitioner whose conviction falls short of this standard.” (emphasis added)).
110 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1731b(h) (2012) (“Whenever he finds a violation . . . , the
Attorney General shall petition [a court] . . . for an [injunction], and upon a [proper]
showing . . . [an injunction] . . . shall be granted . . . .” (emphasis added)); id.
§ 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) (2012) (“If the Court does not make a determination within 24
hours . . . the petition shall be granted by operation of law . . . .”); United States v.
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 234 U.S. 476, 490 (1914) (“[T]he right to
petition the Commission conferred by the statute is positive, and while the refusal to
grant it may be in one sense negative, in another and broader view it is affirmative,
since it refuses that which the statute in affirmative terms declares shall be granted if
only the conditions which the statute provides are found to exist.” (emphasis added)).
111 See supra Part I.A.
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as respectful and humble requests, due to the power dynamics
between subject and King. This tendency of formally supplicatory
language to suggest respect — but not absolute discretion — for the
recipient is particularly relevant in the legal context. Our modern legal
system retains supplicatory terms of art that are vestiges of historical
practice developed in earlier political eras defined by royal sovereignty
and subjecthood112 and that remain meaningful as a cultural attitude
of respect due to the honorable court. To take but one example, a
“prayer for relief” is not literally a “prayer” — it is a demand, couched
in respectful terminology to a judicial authority. Yet it is boilerplate
language in modern complaints.
Thus the word “petition” is ambiguous along two dimensions. On a
semantic level, it is polysemous: the word itself has different meanings
that vary with context. On a pragmatic level, even if we understand it
to be supplicatory on a semantic level, it may be used as a respectful
term of art to soften a formal demand.
There is, thus, an ambiguity whether the term “petition” takes on a
supplicatory or mandatory meaning in the Petition Clause. This
ambiguity casts doubt on the prevailing supplicatory interpretation. In
the sections below, I explore other contextual features of the Petition
Clause and its drafting history that, to the contrary, suggest that a
remedial interpretation is both plausible and more satisfying in the
context of a meritorious legal petition.
2.

The Recipient and Goal Subclauses

The verb “petition” contemplates a relationship among three
concepts113: (1) a petition agent (the petitioner), the subject of the verb,
the person doing the petitioning; (2) a petition recipient,114 the direct
object of the verb, the person or entity to whom the petitioner
addresses her petition; and (3) a petition goal, the indirect object of the

112 See supra Part I.A.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“In
Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never
fails to comply with the judgment of his court.”).
113 In linguistic terminology, the verb “petition” is trivalent because it expects three
core arguments, or more specifically ditransitive, because these three core arguments
are, respectively, a subject, a direct object, and an indirect object. See R.M.W. DIXON, 1
BASIC LINGUISTIC THEORY 229 (2010); P.H. MATTHEWS, THE CONCISE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF LINGUISTICS 415 (2d ed. 2007).
114 In linguistic terminology, this thematic role is patient. See generally David
Dowty, Thematic Proto-Roles and Argument Selection, 67 LANGUAGE 547, 563 (1991)
(illustrating the traditional thematic roles of agent, patient, and goal).
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verb, the thing the petitioner seeks from the recipient.115 In the final
version of the Petition Clause, the petition recipient is identified as
“the Government” and the petition goal is identified as “a redress of
grievances.”
Note that, though the act of petitioning necessarily involves agent,
recipient, and goal as a conceptual matter, the verb “petition” does not
require the overt specification of recipient or goal as a linguistic
matter.116 Each of the following phrases is grammatically sound:
The right to petition
The right to petition the Government
The right to petition for a redress of grievances
The Framers elected to forgo each of these options and instead
embrace a phrase that specifies both recipient and goal. Thus, it is
appropriate to focus carefully on both of these constituent
components of the Petition Clause. To better understand whether the
word “petition” is, in context, supplicatory or remedial, I turn next to
the recipient subclause117 — “the Government”; and the goal
subclause — “for a redress of grievances.”
a.

“The Government”

The Petition Clause is one of the few clauses in the Constitution to
refer to “the Government” as a whole, as opposed to an individual
institution or actor within it.118 The rarity of the term “Government”
115

See supra Part I.A.
In linguistic terminology, the verb “petition” is not strictly ditransitive because
neither the direct object/patient nor the indirect object/goal are necessary. Contrast
the verbs “put” or “give.” Both are ditransitive because they require a direct object and
indirect object in addition to a subject. One can say “he puts the car in the garage,”
but not “he puts the car,” “he puts in the garage,” or “he puts.”
117 I use the term “subclause” not in a technical linguistic sense but only to refer to
a constituent phrase within a single clause of the constitution.
118 Two provisions of the original constitution refer to the District of Columbia as
“the Seat of the Government of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 1, as
does the Twelfth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The Guaranty Clause
guarantees “to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Necessary and Proper Clause refers to “all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8. Thus, the term “Government” occurs a total of six times in the Unites States
Constitution — four times in the original constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 14,
17–18 & art. II, § 1, once in the First Amendment, and once in the Twelfth
Amendment. The Petition Clause is the only provision in the Bill of Rights to use the
term “Government,” and the only provision in the entire constitution to refer to the
“Government” as opposed to the “Government of the United States.”
116
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in the Constitution suggests the significance of its use in the recipient
subclause.
But if it was rare to use the term “Government” in the Constitution,
it was unprecedented to use the term “Government” in the recipient
subclause of a codification of a petitionary right. Its use here suggests
the expansion of the traditional petitionary right to the judicial
context.
The historical record concerning the drafting and ratification of the
Petition Clause is limited. Historians do, however, know some critical
information. When James Madison penned the first draft of the
Petition Clause, his initial version read: “The people shall not be
restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their
common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or
remonstrances for redress of their grievances.”119 A drafting committee
then amended the draft language and substituted the term
“Government” into the recipient subclause.120 This final version was
approved on July 28, 1789.121
Unfortunately, no record survives of the debates that led to the
drafting change. Yet this amendment from “Legislature” to
“Government” was a novel and therefore significant innovation. When
the Founders drafted the First Amendment, seven state constitutions
codified a right to petition, and all used the term “Legislature” in the
recipient subclause.122 And in virtually all prior British and colonial
codifications of a petitionary right, the recipient was identified as
“King” and/or “parliament.”123
119 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 12 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (emphasis added).
120 See id. at 30; see also Pfander, supra note 8, at 958-59 (discussing the drafting
history).
121 See Pfander, supra note 8, at 957.
122 See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 403 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Andrews); Andrews, Right of Access,
supra note 8, at 604 n.159 (citing constitutional provisions from Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire).
123 See, e.g., Bill of Rights 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng. & Wales) (“That it is the
right of the subjects to petition the King . . . .”); STAMP ACT CONGRESS, DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES art. 13 (1765), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 195, 198 (1971) (stating “[t]hat it is the right of the
British subjects in these colonies to petition the King or either House of Parliament”);
1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 70 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed. 1904) (Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, stating
the “right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the
King . . . .”); MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215). Although it did not use the term
“Government,” the colonial Massachusetts Body of Liberties was an outlier in
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The conscious decision of the Framers to depart from virtually all
historical and contemporaneous codifications of the petitionary right
and to explicitly amend the draft text to expand the petitionary
recipient from “Legislature” to “Government” strongly suggests that
the scope of the Petition Clause was expanded with the textual
change.124 The new language encompasses petitions made to all three
branches of government. It therefore covers not only petitions to the
legislative or executive branches, but also legal petitions by legally
injured persons seeking individualized relief from the courts. By
expanding the petitionary right to the judiciary, the Framers
incorporated into the Petition Clause the traditional understanding
that meritorious legal claims filed in court triggered an entitlement to
redress.
b.

“For a redress of grievances”

The remedial theory of the Petition Clause receives further support
from the goal subclause — “for a redress of grievances.”125 Note that
the terms “redress” and “grievances” appear only in the Petition
Clause and nowhere else within the original Constitution or Bill of
Rights.126 And, as previously stated, this subclause is grammatically
unnecessary, suggesting that its inclusion in the text is deliberate and
significant.127
The goal subclause informs both the purpose and the scope of the
petitionary right, and speaks explicitly in terms of remediation. The
Court’s consideration of the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause in
defining that Amendment’s purpose and scope provides a useful
analogy. In the Second Amendment, the operative clause is preceded
by a prefatory clause which “announces [the] purpose” of the
Amendment, and the Court has recognized that this specification of
purpose informs the Amendment’s meaning: “Logic demands that
guaranteeing the right to petition any “publique Court, Councel, or Towne meeting.”
MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES cl. 12 (1641), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 69, 72 (1971).
124 Other scholars agree. See Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 615-16;
Pfander, supra note 8, at 957.
125 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
126 These terms do appear in another Founding document, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), which enumerated a list of grievances, see id. paras. 3–28,
and then stated: “[W]e have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms. Our
repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury,” id. ¶ 29. The
Founders clearly expected, and were aggrieved by the absence of, a remedy for their
petitions to England. See supra note 53.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 111–12.
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there be a link between the stated purpose and the command. . . . That
requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to
resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause.”128
The Petition Clause is distinct from the Second Amendment in that
it is not separated into prefatory and operative clauses. But the Petition
Clause is similar in that it contains additional language — the goal
subclause — that specifies the purpose of a “petition” and hence of the
petitioning right guaranteed by its operative language. “Logic
demands . . . a link between the stated purpose and the command,”
and that “requirement of logical connection may cause” the purposespecifying language “to resolve an ambiguity” in the operative
language.129
By expanding the recipient subclause to “the Government,” the
Framers extended the right to petition to the judicial forum, where the
goal subclause takes on specialized meaning in light of the distinctive
democratic function of legal petitions. When an individual petitions a
court, the grievance she asserts is legal injury, and the redress she
seeks is individualized rights-vindication. In this context, the goal
subclause “for a redress of grievances” connotes the purpose of
ensuring individualized redress, rather than participatory interests,
and logic demands a link between this purpose and the scope of the
command. Thus, the right to petition the courts logically entails a
right to a remedy.
In sum, the remedial interpretation accounts for and draws support
from the precise words the Framers selected — the right “to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”
3.

The Presumption Against Superfluity

The remedial interpretation offers the best account for how the
Petition Clause bears a distinct meaning from the separatelyenumerated Speech Clause. Proponents of the supplicatory
interpretation, by contrast, struggle to distinguish between the two
guarantees, for purely supplicatory communications fall squarely
within the protections of the Speech Clause, thus rendering the
Petition Clause mere surplusage.
Start with a fundamental principle of constitutional interpretation
— the presumption against superfluity:

128
129

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
Id.
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All constitutional provisions have equal dignity, and each
subsection, sentence, and clause of a constitution must be read
in light of the others to form a congruous whole so as not to
render any language superfluous. The presumption and legal
intendment is that every clause in a written constitution has
been inserted for some useful purpose, and courts should
avoid a construction which would render any portion of the
constitution meaningless, idle, inoperative, needless, or
nugatory.130
Now consider the First Amendment as a whole. The First
Amendment separately enumerates “the freedom of speech” and “the
right . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”131 If
the right to petition is merely the right to ask, how can it be
distinguished from the already-enumerated freedom of speech? A
petition to the government generally involves written and oral
communication and necessarily entails expressive conduct already
protected by the Speech Clause, because by definition a petition is
intended to express a grievance.132 Thus, the Supreme Court has
130 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 99 (2016). The Court has repeatedly affirmed this
principle. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 759
(1978); Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 407 (1920) (Clarke, J., dissenting);
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to
be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words
require it.”). This principle of constitutional interpretation goes by different names:
alternatively styled a principle, rule, or canon against or anti superfluity, superfluities,
surplusage or superfluousness. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine:
How Much of a Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 13
n.44 (2011) (citing cases using alternative formulations).
131 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132 For example, when a person files a lawsuit, both the words written on the
physical piece of paper (the complaint), and the expressive act of filing it at the clerk’s
office, are already protected by the Speech Clause. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 4 (2010) (“Even if the material-support statute generally
functions as a regulation of conduct, as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering
coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message.”); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct
must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of
need that the First Amendment requires.” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence
v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). The Court in
Guarnieri almost, but not quite, recognized that petitioning entails expressive conduct
protected by the Speech Clause. “Petitions are a form of expression, and employees
who invoke the Petition Clause in most cases could invoke as well the Speech Clause
of the First Amendment.” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 382 (2011).
It is not clear why the Court said “most cases” instead of “all cases.” Since petitioning
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recognized that a citizen who writes a letter to the President critical of
a public official or a government employee who files a grievance or
lawsuit against his employer enjoys protection under both the Petition
Clause and the Speech Clause.133 But if the Petition Clause provides no
greater protection, it has no practical effect independent of the Speech
Clause.
The presumption against superfluity is neither absolute nor
determinative. But it is relevant here, in a way that supports the
remedial interpretation over the supplicatory interpretation. Some
have critiqued the presumption on the ground that communication
frequently involves repetition and drafters may add language for
emphasis.134 But despite this criticism, the presumption remains an
accepted tool of constitutional interpretation.135 And while
communication may involve repetition and emphasis, this is a
particularly egregious violation of the anti-superfluity principle:
eviscerating an entire nine-word Clause of a constitutional
amendment that the Founders modified shortly before passage.136
This superfluity problem has not gone unnoticed. Initially, the
Court ignored it, emphasizing the unity of the First Amendment.137 In

by definition constitutes a subset of expressive activity, it is difficult to imagine
conduct that would be protected by the Petition Clause but not the Speech Clause.
133 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 387 (“Guarnieri just as easily could have alleged that his
employer retaliated against him for the speech contained within his grievances and
lawsuit.”); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (“A citizen who criticizes a
public official is shielded by the Speech and Press Clauses . . . .” (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
134 Loving v. Internal Revenue Serv., 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“[L]awmakers, like Shakespeare characters, sometimes employ overlap or
redundancy so as to remove any doubt and make doubly sure.”); see also Abbe R.
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — an Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 934-35 (2013).
135 Furthermore, the surplusage in Loving was a provision of a tax statute, not a
Clause in the Bill of Rights. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1014-19.
136 Finally, one can argue that the Petition Clause is superfluous only because the
Speech Clause has been expanded beyond its original intended meaning. Perhaps the
original intention was for the Speech Clause to cover certain oral communications, the
Press Clause to cover certain written communications, and the Petition Clause to
cover certain formal communications. But the more relevant question for present-day
jurists and scholars is how best to address the superfluity problem within the context
of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. Even if the superfluity problem has arisen
in such stark terms because of the Court’s expanding speech doctrine, the superfluity
problem remains.
137 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 364 (1937); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
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the 1985 case of McDonald v. Smith,138 the Court rejected greater
Petition Clause protection from defamation liability, refusing to
“elevate the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status.”139
McDonald sparked scholarly criticism emphasizing the superfluity
problem inherent in the Court’s refusal to distinguish petitioning from
speech.140 In the 2011 case of Borough of Duryea — the Court’s most
recent Petition Clause case — the majority once again rejected greater
Petition Clause protection, this time in the context of government
employer retaliation. Justice Scalia, with characteristically caustic wit,
excoriated the majority’s failure to resolve the superfluity problem:
“The complexity of treating the Petition Clause and Speech Clause
separately is attributable to the inconsiderate disregard for judicial
convenience displayed by those who ratified a First Amendment that
included both provisions as separate constitutional rights.141
Acknowledging this critique, the Guarnieri majority clarified that
McDonald should not be “interpreted to mean that the right to petition
can extend no further than the right to speak,”142 and suggested that
the superfluity problem may be addressed in a future case.
Courts should not presume there is always an essential
equivalence in the two Clauses or that Speech Clause
precedents necessarily and in every case resolve Petition
Clause claims. . . . There may arise cases where the special
concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis
for a distinct analysis; and if that is so, the rules and principles
that define the two rights might differ in emphasis and
formulation.143
138

472 U.S. 479.
Id. at 485.
140 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 8, at 2154-56 (discussing how the Supreme Court has
merged the Petition Clause into other constitutionally protected speech); Eric
Schnapper, ‘Libelous’ Petitions for Redress of Grievances — Bad Historiography Makes
Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303, 305-312 (1989) (analyzing the various reasons the
Supreme Court has given for not providing petitioning with greater protections than
other protected speech); Smith, supra note 13, at 1188 (criticizing the McDonald court
for making careless assumptions concerning the framer’s intentions and whether the
right to petition can be provided greater constitutional protections than other forms of
speech); Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 52 (arguing that the Supreme Court ignored both
the drafter’s intent and the history of petitioning when refusing to grant it greater
protection than that afforded to other protected speech).
141 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 405 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142 Id. at 389 (majority opinion).
143 Id. at 388-89.
139
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Petition Clause scholars have tried, thus far unsuccessfully, to
resolve the superfluity problem. Some have argued that all petitions —
political and legal — enjoy more extensive immunity from
punishment than ordinary speech, in light of the distinctive history of
petitioning practice.144 Others have suggested that all petitions —
political and legal — trigger a governmental duty to respond, again
based on historical petitioning practice.145 These prior theories
distinguish petitioning from speech without distinguishing among
petitions. Thus, they call for greater constitutional protection for all
petitions — whether legal or political, meritorious or otherwise. The
Court has not embraced these theories. The Court has twice rejected
greater petitioning immunity, first in the case of defamation liability
for a political petition, and then in the case of government employer
retaliation for a legal petition.146 The Court has also twice rejected a
duty to respond in cases involving political petitions,147 and scholars
have acknowledged its practical infeasibility.148
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause offers a new
solution to the superfluity problem: petitioning is different from
speech because lawsuits are not just petitions, but distinctive petitions
that enjoy special First Amendment protection.149 Unlike prior efforts,
this approach is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and better

144 See Schnapper, supra note 140, at 345; Smith, supra note 13, at 1188;
Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 52.
145 See Higginson, supra note 14, at 142-43, 155; Hodgkiss, supra note 8, at 572-73.
146 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 389; McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
147 Minn. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984); Smith v. Ark.
State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979). But c.f. Guarnieri, 564
U.S. at 390 (“Unlike speech of other sorts, a lawsuit demands a response.”).
148 See Higginson, supra note 14, at 166; Mark, supra note 8, at 2214-15.
Interestingly, the Obama Administration launched an online petitioning platform, but
it only aimed to respond to the small subset of petitions that receive 100,000
signatures. See Petition the White House on Issues That Matter to You, WHITE HOUSE,
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/responses (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
149 James Pfander argues that the First Amendment right to petition includes a
right to “pursue judicial remedies for government misconduct.” Pfander, supra note 8,
at 906. My theory draws on and resonates with Pfander’s, but there are several key
differences. My claims about the relationship between the right to petition, the
Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign immunity are more modest than Pfander’s.
Compare supra note 18, with Pfander, supra note 8, at 899 & n.3. On the other hand,
my theory is broader than Pfander’s because, while I recognize the governmental
status of the defendant as a factor triggering heightened scrutiny, see infra notes 257–
59 & accompanying text, I claim a right to a remedy for any legal injury, whether
caused by governmental or private misconduct.
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coheres with the historical, textual, and functional distinctiveness of
the Petition Clause.150
4.

The Proposed and Rejected Right to a Remedy Provision

Proponents of the supplicatory interpretation may ask why the
Framers were not even clearer by codifying explicit right-to-a-remedy
language, either in the Petition Clause itself or in a separate
constitutional provision. In this section, I argue that more explicit
language within the Petition Clause would have been problematic. I
then explain that the Founders considered, but ultimately rejected, a
stand-alone, enumerated right to a remedy. The rejection, as explained
below, is best understood as a recognition that adopting the proposed
right-to-a-remedy provision would have raised substantial federalism
concerns, and that the right to remedy was already encompassed by
the right to petition.
First, there is a simple answer to the question why the Framers
declined to replace the Petition Clause with the words “a right to a
remedy.” That hypothetical amendment cannot accommodate
differential treatment of petitions based on whether they are political
or legal, meritorious or frivolous.151

150 The remedial interpretation also enjoys some support from the Guarnieri
Court’s discussion of the relationship between petitioning and speech, and between
the Petition Clause and the Speech Clause. The Court emphasized that
“[i]nterpretation of the Petition Clause must be guided by the objectives and
aspirations that underlie the right.” Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388. The Court
distinguished petitioning from speech on the ground that “[a] petition conveys the
special concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action
by the government to address those concerns.” Id. at 388-89. And the Court
distinguished legal petitioning from speech on the ground that “[u]nlike speech of
other sorts, a lawsuit demands a response.” Id. at 390. The Court was likely referring
to the duty of the governmental defendant, rather than the court, to respond to the
lawsuit — but the two duties are related. If the court simply ignores a lawsuit, there is
no need for the defendant to respond.
151 The Framers could have codified: “A right to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances, and in the case of meritorious legal grievances, the right to redress.”
I concede that this formulation achieves greater clarity and precision. Indeed, any
constitutional provision could be clearer with additional language, but the absence of
such language cannot determine the scope of the constitutional right without absurd
consequences. Moreover, this formulation would be unnecessary if the right to a legal
petition was already understood to include the right of a legally injured person to
obtain a meaningful remedy. This is precisely the understanding that the Framers
would have had, as was discussed in more depth in Part I.A above. Finally, any
explicit codification of a right to a remedy either within the Petition Clause or in a
separate provision triggers federalism concerns, discussed below.

1784

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1741

However, even if the Framers for this reason chose to preserve the
language of the Petition Clause as we see it today, why didn’t they also
include a separately enumerated constitutional right to a remedy? As
discussed above,152 a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision was
codified in Magna Carta,153 in Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes,154 in
Blackstone’s Commentaries,155 and in five state constitutions extant at
the time of the Founding.156 And today, a stand-alone right-to-aremedy provision is contained in forty state constitutions.157
In fact, three of the states that ratified the original Constitution
formally proposed a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision for
inclusion in the Bill of Rights.158 James Madison declined to include
this proposal in his draft, but the Senate on its own initiative proposed
and considered a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision.159 The
Senate ultimately rejected the proposal, and unfortunately, we have no
historical record of the Senate debate preceding that vote.160 But there
is good reason to interpret these drafting choices as consistent with —
indeed supportive of — the remedial interpretation of the Petition
Clause.
To begin, the proposal of a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision
by three states and the Senate demonstrates the importance of a
remedial right to many participants in the Framing process. Its
ultimate failure, however, does not necessarily entail a rejection of the
concept of a remedial right. Bear in mind that a specific separation-ofpowers provision was also proposed and ultimately defeated during
the Framing process.161 Neither scholars nor jurists infer from this fact
that the principle of separation-of-powers was thus rejected by the
152

See supra Part I.A.
MAGNA CARTA, ch. 40 (Eng. 1215).
154 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*45, 55 (1642).
155 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *137.
156 Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 607 & n.166 (citing right-to-remedy
provisions in Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire).
157 Phillips, supra note 3, at 1310 & n.6.
158 See Koch, supra note 4, at 372.
159 Id. at 374-75.
160 Id. (“On September 8, 1789, the Senate considered and rejected an amendment,
based on one of Virginia’s proposed amendments, that would have specifically
guaranteed an individual’s right to a judicial remedy ‘for all injuries or wrongs he may
receive in his person, property, or character.’ Available records provide no insight into
the reasons for the rejection of this provision.”).
161 See Pfander, supra note 8, at 959 & n.219.
153
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Framers. Instead, the rejection of the specific separation-of-powers
provision proposed is generally understood to reflect one or both of
two things: (1) the provision was deemed superfluous because
separation of powers was already established by other constitutional
provisions;162 and/or (2) there were objections to the specific language
of the provision.163
An analogous analysis makes eminent sense when it comes to a
remedial right and the ultimate defeat of the proposed stand-alone
right-to-a-remedy provision. This provision was not defeated because
the Framers rejected the right, but because the right was already
embedded in the Petition Clause.164
This reading of original intent is substantially strengthened when we
recognize a serious drawback to the rejected provision: the potential
aggrandizement of federal jurisdiction. This danger is evident from the
sheer breadth of the proposed language for a constitutional right to a
remedy. Virginia’s proposal, which was identical to North Carolina’s
proposal and similar to Rhode Island’s version, read as follows:
That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy, by
recourse to the laws, for all injuries and wrongs he may receive
in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right
and justice freely, without sale, completely and without denial,
promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or

162 See, e.g., Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 619 (positing that the Senate
may have agreed with House Representative Sherman’s argument that a separation of
powers provision was unnecessary because the Constitution already provided for
separation of powers); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot (Not) Heard ‘Round the
World: Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the Separation of Legislative
and Executive Powers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2010) (hypothesizing that the Senate
may have felt that the constitutionally mandated separation of powers were sufficient
and wanted to maintain some malleability going forward when rejecting the
separation of powers provision); Dennis G. LaGory, Federalism, Separation of Powers,
and Individual Liberties, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1361 (1987) (arguing that Congress
rejected a specific constitutional provision in favor of creating a government with a
structure incapable of concentrating too much power in the hands of any one branch).
163 See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court’s
Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 590 (1990) (arguing
that the reason why the separation of powers provision did not pass was that the
version of the bill the Senate voted on was heavily revised from Madison’s version and
used objectionable language).
164 Note that the Senate considered and rejected the right-to-a-remedy provision on
September 8, 1789. Koch, supra note 4, at 374-75. This was only six weeks after the
Petition Clause was finalized on July 28, 1789. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 957.
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regulations contravening these rights are oppressive and
unjust.165
This proposed language has the virtue of containing the direct and
mandatory language sought by the proponent of the supplicatory
interpretation: The rights to “find a certain remedy . . . for all injuries
and wrongs” and to “obtain right and justice freely . . . completely . . .
[and] promptly” are substantive rights to obtain redress, not mere
procedural rights to ask for redress. Contravention of these rights is
prohibited as “oppressive and unjust.” This language explicitly
provides for a remedy in the case of a meritorious legal petition that
establishes “injuries” through “recourse to the laws.”
But this proposed language also has a fatal defect. A remedial right
logically entails a correlative remedial duty on the part of the
government, and a remedial duty logically entails remedial power. But
the overriding objective of the Bill of Rights, as indicated by the very
first word of the First Amendment, was to constrain — not to
aggrandize — federal power.166 The Framers understood rights
enforcement and remedy provision as the primary realm of state
courts. They drafted Article III carefully to circumscribe the
jurisdiction of federal courts.167 These federalism concerns were at the
forefront at the Founding, but they were entirely absent in the prior
political contexts from which this proposed right-to-a-remedy
provision was adapted. Thus, the proposed provision was vulnerable
to the objection that it would explode the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, usurp the traditional role of the states, and dramatically alter
the federal–state balance.168

165

Koch, supra note 4, at 372 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 1142 (arguing that proposed
amendments concerning the size of government during framing period were aimed at
limiting federal power).
167 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional
Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923,
971-72 (2011) (describing how Article III was drafted to limit the ability of federal
courts to adjudicate matters through standing requirements and often times leaving
the power to issue remedies with state courts).
168 Linde, supra note 4, at 138 n.38 (“But it would have made no sense to ‘limit’
this [federal] government by a demand that it afford every man ‘remedy in due course
of law for injury done him in his person, property or reputation’ — matters of
common law that were not among the powers delegated to Congress.”); see also Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general common
law . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.”).
166
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The federalism objection renders the proposed amendment
problematic. And the Petition Clause renders the proposed
amendment unnecessary if it was already understood to codify a
limited remedial right — and impose a correlative remedial duty —
applicable when petitions were properly brought before the federal
judiciary. If the design problem was to codify a remedial right without
generating federalism concerns, the most elegant solution was to
simply expand the petition recipient in the Petition Clause from “the
Legislature” to “the Government.” Which, of course, is precisely what
the Framers did.
C. Precedent
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause enjoys significant
support from Supreme Court precedent, including both early,
Founding-era opinions, and decades of modern Petition Clause
jurisprudence. Chisholm and Marbury provide strong evidence that the
Founding generation understood the right to petition the Government
to include the right of legally injured persons to obtain meaningful
remedies. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Court
began to more explicitly frame remedial rights in terms of the right to
petition.
1.

Early Recognition of the First Amendment Right to a Remedy

The earliest cases of the Court provide strong support for the
remedial theory. Two years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights in
1791, the Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,169 a dispute
between an individual seeking judicial redress for legal injury and a
state invoking sovereign immunity from federal court jurisdiction. The
English legal system had managed this clash between sovereign
immunity and an individual’s right to a remedy through centuries of
intricate petitioning practice. Chisholm gave the Court its first
opportunity to consider how to resolve these conflicting principles in
the new American constitutional system. In a 4–1 decision, with five
seriatim opinions, the Court came down decisively on the side of
individual remedial rights, declaring that Article III gave federal courts
jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit filed by a British subject against an
unconsenting state.170 Although the Court’s holding focused on the
169 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
170 See id. at 466-67, 469 (opinion of Cushing, J.).

1788

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1741

jurisdictional provisions of Article III, the case logically implicated the
question of whether an individual could petition the federal judiciary
for legal redress of unlawful state conduct.171 This may be why
Attorney General Randolph, arguing for Chisholm on behalf of the
United States, insisted that the jurisdictional dispute “brings into
question a constitutional right.”172
Justice Iredell, the sole dissenter, based his opinion on a detailed
examination of English petitionary practice to the King, which he
characterized as supplicatory.173 His colleagues had two responses.
First, they disputed his characterization of English petitionary
practice, which they deemed supplicatory in form but mandatory in
substance.174 Second, they disputed the legal significance of English
petitionary practice to the new American constitutional order.175 The
Founders had struck a new balance between governmental power and
individual rights, substituting popular sovereignty for royal
sovereignty.176 In this new order, “there are citizens, but no subjects,”
and even a state must “answer the fair demands of its creditor”
according to “general principles of right.”177

171

See id. at 466.
Id. at 420 (oral argument). I have been unable to identify an authoritative
explanation of precisely which “constitutional right” Randolph referred to during oral
argument. The underlying right Chisholm was seeking to enforce was contractual, not
constitutional. It is possible that Randolph conceived of the right in constitutional
terms in light of the Contracts Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 cl. 1. It is also possible
that Randolph was thinking of Article III as a “constitutional right,” but this seems an
unusual formulation for a structural provision, and in any event, if Article III codifies
a right of court access, that right is incorporated by the First Amendment because the
recipient subclause contains Article III courts as a branch of “the Government.” The
frequent discussion of English petitioning practice in the Chisholm opinions, see infra
notes 222, 224 and accompanying text, suggests that a better view is that the
“constitutional right” spoken of is the right to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
173 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437-45 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
174 See, e.g., id. at 460 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“True it is, that now in England the
King must be sued in his Courts by petition, but even now, the difference is only in
the form, not in the thing.”).
175 See, e.g., id. at 466 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The point turns not upon the law
or practice of England . . . but upon the Constitution established by the people of the
United States[.]”); id. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (arguing that the English petition of
right “may have been established as the most respectful form of demand; but we are
not now in a State-Court[.] . . . [A] State, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to
be amenable to the judicial power of the United States . . . [and] has, in that respect,
given up her right of sovereignty.”).
176 See id. at 454, 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
177 Id. at 456.
172
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Chisholm thus supports a remedial theory of the right to petition.
Just two years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, confronted
with a “question [of] constitutional right,”178 the Chisholm Court
decisively rejected a proffered limit on an individual’s right to judicial
redress for legal injury.
Though the Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm’s specific
holding, limiting federal court jurisdiction in suits against the states,179
the Court similarly linked petitionary practice and remedial rights a
decade after Chisholm, in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.180
Writing for a unanimous court, and citing Blackstone, Chief Justice
John Marshall emphasized the individual’s right to obtain — and the
courts’ corresponding duty to provide — meaningful judicial redress
for a meritorious legal grievance. Marshall declared it “a settled and
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a
remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”181
Marshall made precisely the same functional distinction between
political and legal grievances and accountability that underlies the
remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause. On matters of
discretionary policy, the President “is accountable only to his country
in his political character . . . .”182 But when it comes to individual legal
rights, he “who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy.”183 As noted above in Part II.A,
Marshall linked this remedial right to the right to petition, specifically
invoking English petitioning practice and emphasizing its mandatory
and remedial character. “In Great Britain the king himself is sued in
the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the
judgment of his court.”184 Marshall also linked this remedial guarantee
to a form of individual democratic accountability fundamental to the
American constitutional order. He characterized “the right of every
[injured] individual to claim the protection of the laws” as “[t]he very
essence of civil liberty” and affording such protection among “the first
duties of government.”185 “[I]f the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right,” Marshall warned, the United States
178

Id. at 420 (oral argument).
See supra note 18 for a discussion of the relationship between the Eleventh
Amendment and the Petition Clause.
180 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
181 Id. at 147 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109).
182 Id. at 165-66.
183 Id. at 166.
184 Id. at 163.
185 Id.
179
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government “will certainly cease to deserve [the] high appellation” of
being “emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”186
Marshall ultimately concluded that the federal court could not
provide a remedy in this particular case because of Article III limits on
federal court jurisdiction.187 This case-specific remedy denial is
consistent with the theory that the First Amendment includes a
meaningful, but non-absolute, right to a remedy, and the tiered
scrutiny doctrinal framework proposed infra, which presumes that
burdens on the remedial right may be permissible if justified by a
sufficiently compelling governmental interest. Constitutional limits on
federal court jurisdiction, articulated in Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment, necessarily entail a judgment that the structural interests
they serve justify the remedial burden they impose. But while Marbury
does not stand for an absolute remedial right, it does provide powerful
support for a limited but meaningful First Amendment right to a
remedy — the “right [of an individual] to resort to the laws of his
country for a remedy”188 through “the respectful form of a petition”189
— for a redress of a legal grievance — the “proper redress” for a legal
injury.190
Twenty years after Marbury, Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as
circuit justice, listed among the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship protected by Article IV, Section 2 the right to “institute and
maintain actions of any kind” in state courts.191 And in 1838, the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of remedial access to the
courts without the same type of link to petitioning practice evidenced
in Chisholm and Marbury.192 The Court repeatedly reaffirmed the
characterization of the court access right as a privilege and immunity
of national citizenship in four cases between 1870 and 1907.193 During
186

Id.
See id. at 176, 180 (“The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the
act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to
public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution . . . . [A] law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and . . . courts, as well as other departments, are
bound by that instrument.”).
188 Id. at 166.
189 Id. at 163.
190 Id. at 147.
191 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
192 See Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 624 (1838) (It would be
a ”monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no
remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist”).
193 See Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (“The right to
sue and defend in the courts . . . is one of the highest and most essential privileges of
187
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this time, and going forward, the Court also began to analyze remedial
rights and remedy denials in terms of Due Process and Equal
Protection.194 As the Court shifted its focus to other textual bases of
remedial rights, it also began to ignore the legal, rights-enforcing half
of the dual Petition Clause, recasting the right to petition as a purely
political right directed exclusively to Congress.195 In this way, the First
Amendment right to a remedy, after its early recognition in Chisholm
and Marbury, entered a period of neglect and erasure, lying dormant
in Supreme Court jurisprudence, waiting to be rediscovered in
modern times.
2.

Modern Rediscovery of the First Amendment Right to a Remedy

Neither the Court’s most recent Petition Clause case196 nor Petition
Clause scholarship has recognized the extent to which modern
Petition Clause precedent supports the remedial theory. This failure of
recognition is revealed vividly by the attack Justice Scalia penned in
Guarnieri,197 which misunderstood even the scope of precedential
support for the more basic principle that lawsuits are petitions. Yet a
full and fair reading of all the relevant precedent provides substantial
citizenship . . . .”); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898) (noting that previous
decisions, which held that the right to maintain actions was an essential privilege
guaranteed by the Constitution, had not been modified or overruled); Cole v.
Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1890) (“The intention of section 2, art. 4, was to
confer on the citizens of the several states a general citizenship, and to communicate
all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same state would be
entitled to under the like circumstances; and this includes the right to institute
actions.”); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (“[T]he [privileges
and immunities] clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a
citizen of one State to . . . maintain actions in the courts of the State . . . .”).
194 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6, at 568-80 (citing multiple cases analyzing the
remedial access right through a due process lens between 1875 and 1976). For other
recent equal protection cases, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
195 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (“Thus, [included]
among the rights and privileges of national citizenship recognized by this court
[is] . . . the right to petition Congress for a redress of grievances . . . .”); In re Quarles,
158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895) (suggesting that the authority to protect rights conferred by
the Constitution is reserved exclusively to Congress); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (“[The First Amendment] was not intended to limit the powers
of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the
National government alone.”).
196 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011). This is the most recent
Supreme Court Petition Clause case at the time of publication.
197 See supra note 12.

1792

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1741

support for the premise that lawsuits are petitions that trigger special
First Amendment protection in the form of a remedial right.
The most commonly recognized precedential support for the claim
that lawsuits are petitions is a line of cases — what I call the economic
litigation line — which limited the application of federal antitrust and
labor laws when businesses petition courts by suing competitors or
employees — a petitioning immunity.198 Yet the remedial thrust of
these cases is often overlooked, partly because they involved
interpretation of federal statutes, and partly because the alleged
Petition Clause infringements mostly consisted of retaliation — in the
form of antitrust or labor law liability — imposed for litigation
activity.
Consider Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,199 in which the
Court invoked the Petition Clause in limiting the NLRB’s ability to
enjoin a state lawsuit as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA
absent a determination that the suit was baseless and motivated by
retaliatory intent.200 The Court explicitly framed the NLRB’s prior
restraint as an absolute remedy denial, emphasizing that enjoining a
meritorious lawsuit “totally deprive[s] [the employer] of a remedy for
an actual injury,”201 stripping the employer of “local judicial
protection from tortious conduct.”202 The Court, moreover, explained
that “knowingly frivolous” claims do not advance “[t]he first
amendment interests involved in private litigation,” which the court
identified as “public airing of disputed facts,” “the psychological
benefits of vindication,” and “compensation for violated rights.”203 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Brennan recognized a constitutional “right
to file and to prosecute a lawsuit”204 and distinguished between prior
restraints and subsequent sanctions.205 This case provided strong
198 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), and
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49
(1993), concerned the scope of the Sherman Act. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896-97 (1984), and
BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002), concerned the scope of the
National Labor Relations Act. This was the sole line of cases cited by the Guarnieri
majority in support of the proposition that lawsuits are petitions. Guarnieri, 564 U.S.
at 387.
199 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
200 Id. at 748-49.
201 Id. at 742.
202 Id. at 741-42.
203 Id. at 743 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
204 Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
205 See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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support for the remedial theory: it recognized that the right to petition
the courts is particularly threatened by prior restraints that would
“totally deprive[] [a litigant] of a remedy for an actual injury.”206
The economic litigation line was neither the only nor the first line of
modern case law recognizing lawsuits as petitions — and providing
often-overlooked support for a remedial access right. Less attention207
has been paid to two other lines of cases: what I call the group
litigation line — in which the Court struck down state regulations that
interfered with the legal efforts of groups like the NAACP and labor
unions;208 and what I call the prisoner access line — in which the
Court developed an increasingly broad right of prisoners to access the
courts.209 Each case in each of these lines is a mixed drink, not a pure
shot of Petition Clause analysis, for the Petition Clause inquiry was
bound up with other interpretative questions. Just as the economic
litigation line involved federal statutes, the group litigation cases
involved other First Amendment rights,210 and the prisoner access line
implicated federal habeas, due process, and equal protection.211 But
206 Id. at 742. Although less explicitly concerned with the remedial function of the
right to petition, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972), another economic litigation case, is also relevant to my theory. The Court in
this case embraced an exception to immunity from retaliation for petitioning activity
in the case of “sham litigation.” Citing prior First Amendment precedent, see id. at
514-15, it explained that the burden antitrust liability imposed on the defendant’s First
Amendment right to petition the courts was justified precisely because it was
necessary to protect the plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition the courts. Id. at
511-12, 515. I incorporate this insight into my doctrinal approach. See infra notes
260–61 and accompanying text.
207 See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 386 (2011) (in majority
opinion, omitting mention of these lines of doctrine); id. at 402 & n.1 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (dismissing some of these
cases as “advert[ing] vaguely” to lawsuits as petitions or as “habeas corpus cases,” and
ignoring others); Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 571-76 (failing to consider
important cases such as Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), in her analysis of the
prisoner access line).
208 See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United
Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
209 See infra notes 220–41 and accompanying text.
210 See United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 578-79 (“First Amendment guarantees of
free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad workers the right to . . . act
collectively to secure good, honest lawyers to assert their claims against railroads.”);
United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222, 225 (“free speech, press, petition, or assembly”
and “associational rights”); Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2, 5-6, 8 (“freedom of speech,
petition and assembly” and “associational rights”); Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29, 444-45.
211 See cases discussed infra at notes 220–41 and accompanying text.
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instead of distilling out their Petition Clause insights, courts and
scholars tend to dismiss these cases altogether.
Take the group litigation line, in which the Justices agreed and
repeatedly insisted that lawsuits are petitions for redress designed to
enforce preexisting rights.212 The Court itself stated that the “common
thread running through [all these] decisions . . . is that that collective
activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.”213
In NAACP v. Button,214 which struck down on First Amendment
grounds a Virginia statute criminalizing the referral of prospective
litigants to the NAACP, the Court stressed the remedial purpose of
litigation215 and the functional importance of legal petitions in
protecting political minorities.216 In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, which upheld unions’ First
Amendment right to recommend attorneys to their members,217 the
Court focused on the importance of competent counsel to individuals’
right to petition the courts.218 This emphasis reflected a concern with
meaningful access to courts — not the mere technical ability to lodge a
complaint, but the practical opportunity “to vindicate their legal
rights.”219
212 See Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 7 (“A State could not . . . infringe in any way the
right . . . to be fairly represented in lawsuits . . . . The State can no more keep these
workers from using their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use
more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal
rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped.”); see also Button,
371 U.S. at 429-30 (“[L]itigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances.”); id. at 455 (Harlan., J, dissenting)
(“[T]he State surely may not broadly prohibit individuals . . . from joining together to
petition a court for redress of their grievances . . . .”) Some Justices rejected the
extension of Button to cases involving personal injury litigation. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at
10 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, others agreed that “[t]he grievances for redress
of which the right of petition was insured . . . are not solely religious or political
ones.” United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 5310 (1945)).
213 United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added).
214 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
215 See id. at 453 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Litigation is often the desirable and
orderly way . . . of obtaining vindication of fundamental rights.”).
216 See id. at 429-30 (“[U]nder the conditions of modern government, litigation
may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of
grievances.”).
217 Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8.
218 See id. at 7 (“Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights
when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries . . . .”).
219 Id.
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It is the prisoner access line, however, which constitutes the most
intriguing and least considered modern line of precedent that,
properly understood, supports a remedial reading of the Petition
Clause.220 In Cruz v. Beto, the Supreme Court required, pursuant to
the First Amendment, a full adjudication of a Buddhist inmate’s
allegation of religiously discriminatory prison practices.221 The First
Amendment violation here was neither retaliation for litigation activity
nor denial of forum access, but rather the trial court’s refusal to
adjudicate, and, if warranted, remedy, Beto’s claim of legal injury.222
Subsequently, in Bounds v. Smith,223 the Court held “that the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”224
220 The origins of this doctrinal line are four cases between 1941 and 1971, in
which the Court struck down state prison rules that burdened court access for
prisoners. See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
These four cases developed this court access right with an emphasis on federal habeas,
due process, and equal protection, but its precise textual basis was unclear. In the
1972 case of Cruz v. Beto, however, the Court explicitly identified this court access
right as a component of the Petition Clause. See 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (“[P]ersons
in prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government for redress
of grievances which, of course, includes ‘access of prisoners to the courts for the
purpose of presenting their complaints.’” (quoting Avery, 393 U.S. at 485)). In three
prisoner cases over the next three years, lawsuits were treated as First Amendment
petitions without any Justice disputing the premise. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 244 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828
(1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 n.5 (1973).
221 See Cruz, 405 U.S. at 321-22 (discussing a Buddhist inmate’s Constitutional
right to remedial court access based on allegations of religious discrimination).
222 See id. at 321 (the lower court “denied relief without a hearing or any
findings”).
223 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
224 Id. at 828. Though Bounds reaffirmed the court access right as fundamental, and
conceptualized the right in remedial terms, it failed to specify the right’s textual basis.
See id. at 821-833. Though Bounds approvingly cited Beto, 405 U.S. 319 — and the
three cases Beto cited as support for a First Amendment right of court access (Gilmore,
404 U.S. 15; Avery, 393 U.S. 483; and Hull, 312 U.S. 546) — Bounds never mentioned
the First Amendment framework embraced so explicitly in Beto and twice repeated by
the Court in the four-year period between Beto and Bounds. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 828;
Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660 n.5. Two months after Bounds was decided, Justice Stevens
explicitly invoked a First Amendment right to petition the Courts without any Justice
disputing the premise. See Montanye, 427 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And in
the years after Bounds, Justices continued to recognize without objection a First
Amendment right to petition the courts. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523
(1984) (“Like others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the
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The Bounds majority insisted that the “inmate access to the courts
[must be] adequate, effective, and meaningful”225 and conceptualized
meaningful access as something broader than mere forum access,
observing that judges might “overlook meritorious cases” without
effective litigation,226 and emphasizing the remedial dynamic of legal
petitions, judicial relief, and protection of individual rights.227 Four
years later, in Rhodes v. Chapman,228 the Court rejected an Eighth
Amendment challenge to prison conditions, but emphasized that the
federal courts have a duty to remedy constitutional violations.229 In
concurrence, Justice Brennan linked a prisoner’s right to petition to a
court’s “obligation to take steps to remedy the violations,”230 and no
Justice disputed Brennan’s suggestion that the right to petition entails
this remedial duty.231
More recently, there has been dissensus on the Court as to the
remedial scope of prisoners’ court access right. In Lewis v. Casey,232 the
Court limited the Bounds right to access legal materials — but did so
Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of
access to the courts.”); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 & n.9 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the “constitutional minima” to
which prisons must conform, including permitting the constitutional right of access to
judicial remedies). Finally, in Lewis v. Casey, where the Court limited but reaffirmed
Bounds, both the respondents and Justice Stevens framed the Bounds court access right
in terms of the right to petition. See 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (describing respondents’
claim); id. at 405-06 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822-23.
226 Id. at 826.
227 See id. at 824-25 (assuming that prisoners must have “a reasonably adequate
opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts”); id. at 827-28 (emphasizing that “original actions seeking . . . vindication of
fundamental civil rights . . . are of ‘fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional
scheme’ because they directly protect our most valued rights” (citations omitted)); id.
at 828 (“[T]he prisoner petitions here are the first line of defense against
constitutional violations.”).
228 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
229 See id. at 352 (“[F]ederal courts will discharge their duty to protect
constitutional rights.” (citing Beto, 405 U.S. at 321) (other citations omitted)).
230 Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
231 Indeed, every opinion recognized the important role of the courts in enforcing
rights — particularly those of political minorities. See id. at 352; id. at 359
(“Insulated . . . from political pressures, and charged with the duty of enforcing the
Constitution, courts are in the strongest position to insist that unconstitutional
conditions be remedied . . . .”); id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen conditions are deplorable and the
political process offers no redress . . . the federal courts are required by the
Constitution to play a role.”).
232 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
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mostly in dicta.233 Justice Stevens in dissent cast the court access right
in terms that were both based on the Petition Clause and explicitly
remedial.234 The majority, in dicta, sought to limit the right’s scope to
forum access235 and to petitions challenging confinement or the
conditions of confinement.236 However, three justices would have
embraced a right to “research, consult about, file, or litigate”237 a
broader class of claims.238
A decade after Lewis, in the 2006 case of Woodford v. Ngo,239 Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, dissented from the
Court’s strict construction of an exhaustion requirement in the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, calling for application of the constitutional
avoidance canon because the Court’s interpretation may violate the
“fundamental right” to “access the courts” guaranteed by the “First
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of
grievances.”240 Note that the inmate in this case was allowed to file a
lawsuit but denied a remedy on exhaustion grounds.241 The majority
did not dispute Justice Stevens’ implicit assertion that the First
Amendment entailed a remedial duty, but rather did not engage with
the constitutional question at all. In sum, the prisoner access line
provides substantial support for a First Amendment right to a remedy,
as a matter of both source and scope.
Outside of these three lines of doctrine, the Court considered a
remedial access claim in the 2002 case of Christopher v. Harbury.242
233

Id. at 350-56.
See id. at 404-06, 405 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing prisoner access and
economic litigation cases to establish that the right of court access is part of the right
to petition, and noting that “[w]ithout the ability to access the courts . . . all of us —
prisoners and free citizens alike — would be deprived of the first — and often the
only — ‘line of defense’ against constitutional violations”).
235 See id. at 354-55 (majority opinion); see also id. at 409 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court’s “conclusion regarding the scope of the right is
purely dicta”).
236 Id. at 355 (majority opinion). But see id. at 404 (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (“This case does not require us to
consider . . . and I would not address such issues here.”); id. at 409 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“This statement is also largely unnecessary.”).
237 Id. at 401 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
238 See id. at 403-04. Both sides of this debate recognize that court access vindicates
underlying rights.
239 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
240 Id. at 122-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
241 Id. at 87 (majority opinion).
242 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
234
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The Guatemalan government captured, tortured, and executed
Harbury’s husband, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Among other
allegations, Harbury claimed that State Department officials
intentionally misled her about her husband’s whereabouts, preventing
her from obtaining a meaningful remedy; had the officials revealed to
her that her husband was in Guatemalan custody, she would have
pursued emergency injunctive relief, which could have saved his
life.243 The Court recognized that some of its prior cases had
“grounded the right of access to courts in . . . the First Amendment
Petition Clause,”244 among other textual sources. The Court then
emphasized the link between right and remedy:
[T]he very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide
some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to
seek judicial relief for some wrong . . . . [T]he right [of court
access] is ancillary to the underlying claim [of legal wrong],
without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being
shut out of court.245
For this reason, the Court held that a “backward-looking access claim”
like Harbury’s must identify both “the underlying cause of action and
its lost remedy.”246 The Court ultimately rejected Harbury’s access
claim because it could not uniquely “address any injury she has
suffered.”247 Thus, instead of rejecting this remedial access claim, the
Court imposed a pleading requirement that embraced the claim’s
remedial logic.
Taken together, Harbury and the three lines of court access cases
provide strong, yet heretofore under-appreciated, precedential support
for a remedial theory of the Petition Clause.
II.

APPLICATION

In this Part, I sketch how the remedial interpretation of the Petition
Clause might translate into a workable doctrinal framework. I suggest
a framework of tiered scrutiny that coheres with other strands of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, I suggest how this new framework
243

Id. at 409-10.
Id. at 415 n.12.
245 Id. at 414-15.
246 Id. at 415-16 (emphasis added); see also id. at 416 (“[B]ecause these backwardlooking cases are brought to get relief unobtainable in other suits, the remedy sought
must itself be identified . . . .” (emphasis added)).
247 Id. at 422.
244
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might change the analysis and outcomes of challenges to a wide
variety of real-world remedial access barriers.
A. A New Doctrinal Framework for Remedial Access Claims
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause translates
naturally into a tiered scrutiny doctrinal framework for remedial
access claims, whereby legally injured persons could challenge, and
courts would scrutinize, rules or practices that denied, limited, or
delayed access to meaningful judicial remedies. While full
development of this framework lies beyond the scope of this article,
this section begins the process by presenting the essential features of
this framework, so as to suggest in more concrete terms the theory’s
primary doctrinal significance.
Under this proposed framework, a successful remedial access claim
would entail: (1) a particularized legal injury (which would trigger a
presumptive remedial entitlement); (2) a deprivation of a minimally
adequate remedy (which would constitute a remedial burden); and
(3) the absence of a sufficient governmental interest justifying the
remedial burden (which would elevate the remedial burden into an
impermissible infringement of the remedial right). I discuss each of
these elements below.
First, the remedial component of the Petition Clause only applies to
legal petitions as opposed to political petitions. Thus the petitioner
must show that she seeks redress of an individualized, legal grievance
concerning the alleged violation of a pre-existing legal right. The
petitioner must generally show that, pursuant to valid extant
substantive and procedural law,248 she established legal injury or likely
would have established legal injury but for the challenged burden.249
248 The seemingly simple requirement masks an array of related definitional
challenges centering upon one primary question: which legal rules should be
understood as burdening litigants’ access to extant legal remedies, and which legal rules
can be said to validly define whether they have suffered a cognizable legal injury at all?
Answering this question requires some effort to distinguish between substantive,
procedural, and remedial rules. We might say, for example, that a legislative repeal of
a statutory cause of action does not deny a remedy; it rather denies a right. On the
other hand, we might say that an exorbitant filing fee without any opportunity to file
in forma pauperis would deny a remedy to those who suffered legally cognizable
injuries. The line between the repeal of a right and the denial of a remedy, however, is
not always clear, and the way in which judges draw it would have serious
consequences for the scope of the First Amendment right to a remedy. On the one
hand, if all procedural and substantive rules could be challenged as violations of
remedial access under the Petition Clause, there would be an explosion of claims and
a threat to legislatures’ ability to define the law. This was one of the primary reasons
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Next, the petitioner must show her right has been burdened by
demonstrating a remedial deprivation. Note that the right to a remedy
is only the right to a minimally adequate remedy, not the right to the
petitioner’s preferred remedy, or the maximal remedy. Minimal
adequacy must be defined objectively in terms of the underlying
purposes of remediation — vindication, retrospective compensation,
and prospective protection of legal rights through deterrence of future
violations.250 To satisfy the adequacy element, the petitioner will
generally have to show complete denial of any remedy, or that the
remedy was so severely limited as to fall below an objective minimum
standard — to fail to meaningfully serve the vindicatory,
compensatory, and deterrent functions of judicial remedies such that
it effectively undermines the underlying legal right.251
The final element of a remedial access claim is abridgement: the
absence of a sufficient governmental reason for burdening the
remedial right. The first two elements — an inadequate remedy for the
violation of a legal right — only show that the right to a remedy has
been implicated or burdened. But implication does not necessarily
mean violation; not every burden is an impermissible abridgement.
Instead, the government must proffer reasons for the burdening law or
practice. The court would then consider the character and severity of
the remedial burden and assess both the strength of the asserted
why Professor Andrews eschewed a remedial definition of court access. See Andrews,
Right of Access, supra note 8, at 560. On the other hand, if no procedural or
substantive law could ever be challenged, the right to a remedy could easily be
circumvented by the simple expedient of characterizing limits on remedies as
substantive or procedural rules — as new defenses, limitations on causes of actions,
and so forth.
Consider, for example, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which
provides for immediate dismissal of any lawsuits against gun manufacturers based on
third-party misuse. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902(b), 7903(5)(A) (2012). Does this provision
limit rights or remedies? See City of N.Y. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 397
(2d Cir. 2008) (concluding — I would argue, incorrectly — that the Act does not
implicate the right to petition because it provides a substantive defense). Whether
specific types of rules should be categorized as changing rights or burdening remedies
deserves considerable further attention that goes beyond the scope of the paper.
249 There is an additional definitional question of what standard of likelihood of
success would apply.
250 See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“The first
amendment interests involved in private litigation [include] compensation for violated
rights and interests [and] the psychological benefits of vindication . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
251 See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 688-89, 691, 718 (Tex. 1988)
(invalidating, on state right-to-a-remedy grounds, the application of a statutory
damages cap “[i]n the case of a permanently and catastrophically injured infant”).
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governmental interest and the closeness of fit between this interest and
the challenged law or practice.252
Courts should apply this balancing test using a tiered scrutiny
framework familiar to First Amendment jurisprudence, under which
certain factors would trigger heightened scrutiny. For example,
borrowing from the speech context, a burden that is petitioner-based is
more suspect than one that is petitioner-neutral.253 If the burden
depends on the identity of the rights-holder — for example, a rule
limiting access to the courts for prisoners only254 — heightened
scrutiny is appropriate. Similarly, if the burden is content-based rather
than content-neutral, heightened scrutiny should apply.255 Thus, if the
burden only applies when a particular type of grievance is asserted, or
when a particular class of defendants is involved — for example, doctors
or gun manufacturers256 — the burden is more suspect and should be
subjected to more exacting scrutiny. Furthermore, just as First
Amendment protection is greater for core political speech,257
heightened scrutiny should apply if the burden is imposed only where
the government itself, rather than a private party, is the defendant in a
lawsuit. This means that governmental immunity doctrines outside of
the sovereign immunity context,258 such as absolute immunity for
judges and prosecutors and qualified immunity for executive officials
252 Cf., e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014)
(“[W]e must assess the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means
selected to achieve that objective.”); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724,
744 (2008) (“[T]he strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness
of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.”).
253 Cf., e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010)
(“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity.”).
254 See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C. (2012)); Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (“Congress enacted the [PLRA] . . . in the wake of a
sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts . . . [and] contains a variety of
provisions designed to bring this [prison] litigation under control.”); Katherine A.
Macfarlane, A New Approach to Local Rules, 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 121, 144-48 (2015)
(describing local rules setting restrictions that apply only to prisoners).
255 Cf., e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(describing strict scrutiny standard for content-based restrictions in the speech
context).
256 See supra note 248 (discussing Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act).
257 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (“The First Amendment has its fullest
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”
(quotations omitted)).
258 The Eleventh Amendment qualifies the applicability of the Petition Clause to
sovereign immunity. See supra note 18.

1802

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1741

including police officers and school administrators, would be
subjected to heightened scrutiny. However, “reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions” would be permissible.259
Finally, particular categories of asserted governmental interests may
warrant either heightened solicitude or heightened skepticism. Where
a burden on remedial access is imposed in order to preserve the
integrity and efficacy of the judicial system and to ensure its
availability to all, the burden may have a particularly strong
justification because, in globo, it enhances remedial access to the
courts.260 By contrast, courts may refuse to credit an asserted
governmental interest in suppressing petitions or their efficacy as a
mechanism of citizen influence and governmental accountability.261
Beyond this tiered scrutiny framework, a First Amendment right to a
remedy may also impact the proper application of the constitutional
avoidance canon,262 equal protection principles,263 and the Eleventh
259

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972)
(“Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to
keep others from publishing is not”); see also supra note 206.
261 The Roberts Court has invoked this anti-suppression principle to reject asserted
justifications for campaign finance regulation based on limiting the influence of
wealthy donors. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1450-51 (“[T]he possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner
‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties . . . [does not allow]
the Government . . . to seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access”.).
However, the Court has not yet recognized the First Amendment significance of the
fact that non-constitutional official immunity doctrines are explicitly justified as
mechanisms to limit the influence of rights-holders on official decision-making. But
see Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1993) (“A
primary purpose of providing officials with qualified immunity is to ensure that fear of
personal liability will not unduly influence or inhibit their performance of public
duties.”). I intend to consider this disconnect in a future article.
262 When choosing between reasonable interpretations of a statutory provision, the
avoidance canon combined with a First Amendment right to a remedy would favor the
one that imposed a lesser burden on the ability of a legally injured person to obtain a
meaningful remedy. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 122 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 518-19 (2002) (construing
NLRA provision narrowly to avoid “the difficult constitutional question whether a
class of petitioning may be declared unlawful when a substantial portion is
subjectively and objectively genuine”); Alexander H. Schmidt, Challenging the Supreme
Court’s American Express Decision Under the First Amendment Petition Clause, 28
ANTITRUST 39, 43 (2014).
263 In addition to the heightened scrutiny I contemplate under the First
Amendment, courts may also apply heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause if a rule or practice differentially burdens an individual’s exercise of her
fundamental right — here, to obtain an adequate remedy for legal injury. San Antonio
260
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Amendment.264 Together, these doctrinal innovations would provide
legally injured persons with powerful tools with which to challenge
remedial access barriers.265
B. A Survey of Vulnerable Remedial Access Burdens
These new doctrinal tools would have far-reaching practical
implications, calling into question a wide array of state and federal laws.
One way to gauge how a First Amendment right to a remedy would
operate in practice is to consider those remedial access barriers
invalidated by state courts pursuant to state constitutional provisions
guaranteeing a right to a remedy. Such barriers include preconditions
to filing suit, statutes of repose, statutes of limitations when applied
against minors or with no discovery rule exception, and limits on
compensatory damages.266 Each of these barriers denies, limits, or
delays remedies for a particular class of plaintiffs, defendants, or
claims. A First Amendment right to a remedy would bring much

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
264 The First Amendment right to a remedy does not trump the later-ratified
Eleventh Amendment. As a result, there are cases in which a federal court will not
have jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by an individual against a state, despite the
remedial burden. However, there is great debate over the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment, and current Eleventh Amendment doctrine goes farther than the literal
text requires. See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1672 (2004). See generally Amar, Of
Sovereignty, supra note 1. A First Amendment right to a remedy would inform this
debate, because the proper interpretive inquiry would be how to strike the correct
balance between two constitutional values, rather than how to interpret the Eleventh
Amendment against a constitutional abyss. This is a more moderate approach than
James Pfander takes, in arguing that the Petition “clause’s affirmation of government
suability operates as a constitutional antidote to the familiar doctrine of sovereign
immunity[.]” Pfander, supra note 8, at 899.
265 Moreover, the set of laws or practices courts may invalidate or require pursuant
to the right to a remedy is not the full measure of its potential impact. See Aliza Plener
Cover, Archetypes of Faith: How Americans See, and Believe in, Their Constitution, 26
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 555, 573 (2015) (“[C]ombination of deep faith and relatively
unschooled knowledge allows people to make claims about the Constitution that have
important political consequences, without being fully bound by precedent or text.”).
For example, even if judges conclude that a First Amendment right to a remedy does
not empower them to mandate appointed counsel in civil cases, federal or state
lawmakers may elect to provide attorneys in certain cases, and public discourse about
a right to a remedy may affect these policy choices by framing certain priorities in
terms of constitutional values. See Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2016, S. 2540,
114th Cong. (proposed bill that would provide counsel in immigration proceedings to
children, persons with disabilities, and victims of abuse, torture, or violence).
266 Phillips, supra note 3, at 1311-12 (citing cases).
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needed uniformity to this area of law, calling into question similar
rules in any state, irrespective of differences in state constitutional text
and interpretation.267
Moreover, a First Amendment right to a remedy would call into
question a host of federal statutory provisions as judicially construed,
including the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,268 the
Prison Litigation Reform Act,269 the Federal Arbitration Act,270 the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,271 and doctrines of
qualified and absolute immunity.272
To take but one of these examples, suppose a police officer fatally
shoots an unarmed man. Even if the officer violated the victim’s
Fourth Amendment rights, under the Supreme Court’s increasingly
aggressive qualified immunity doctrine, the federal courts may provide
no remedy. Qualified immunity prevents injured individuals from
obtaining a remedy even for an admitted violation of a constitutional
right if that right has not yet been articulated with sufficient clarity.273
Indeed, the petitioner may not even get the remedial benefit of
declaratory relief.274 This remedy denial applies only when the
defendant is a governmental actor, and thus a remedial access
challenge would trigger heightened scrutiny. Whether the doctrine
survives that scrutiny would depend on the strength of interests

267 State right-to-a-remedy provisions have been interpreted in remarkably different
ways by different state courts. Scholars have struggled to explain these divergent
approaches. See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 4, at 244 (“[B]oth [of the major] variations
have been expansively and narrowly interpreted.”); Phillips, supra note 3, at 1314-15.
268 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
269 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 132 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18,
28, & 42 U.S.C.).
270 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
14 (2012)).
271 Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–
7903 (2012)).
272 Note that I am referring here to non-constitutional immunity doctrines, rather
than the constitutionally-driven sovereign immunity doctrine. U.S. CONST. amend. XI;
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
273 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The
Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing
Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1244-48 (2015).
274 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001), and permitting judges to dispose of a case on qualified immunity
grounds without resolving the merits of the constitutional claim).
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proffered in its defense, and the closeness of fit between the immunity
and those interests.
CONCLUSION
The scope and independent significance of the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause are important doctrinal questions presently steeped in
uncertainty. I address these questions by proposing an alternative
theory of the Petition Clause’s meaning: the right “to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances” guarantees not only the right
to ask for redress from any of the three branches of government, but,
in the special case of meritorious legal petitions, a right to obtain a
minimally adequate remedy. This theory enjoys supports from the
Clause’s history, text, and judicial interpretation. Historically, the coevolution of the English right to a remedy and right to petition, which
together provided strong protections for individuals to receive
remedies in response to legal petitions addressed to the King,
Parliament, and courts, support the idea that legal petitions would
have been understood to entail a correlative right to a remedy. The
text and drafting history of the Clause, including its linguistic
structure and the unprecedented extension of the recipient subclause
from “the Legislature” to “the Government,” strongly support the
remedial interpretation. Finally, early American and more modern
case law provide under-appreciated confirmation of the notion that
the petitionary right entails a remedial component in the case of legal
petitions. All of this evidence, which supports elevated expectations
and requirements of obtaining the redress sought in the context of
legal petitions, makes sense when we understand that both petitioning
practice and the Petition Clause itself serve a dual function within a
democratic society: to protect majoritarian participatory interests
through political petitions, and to protect minoritarian rights
vindication through legal petitions.
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause, if accepted,
would have immediate and far-reaching consequences. It would lead
to increased judicial scrutiny into burdens placed on individuals’
remedial rights in such varied contexts as governmental immunity
doctrines, caps on tort damage awards, and legislative limitations on
prisoners’ ability to enforce their constitutional rights. The time has
come to resolve the ongoing state of confusion surrounding the
meaning of the Petition Clause, and to vindicate the Framers’ intent to
provide remedial protections to legally injured persons petitioning the
courts.

